Public Policy Applications of Regression Discontinuity Design by Shapiro, Eva
UC Santa Cruz
UC Santa Cruz Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Public Policy Applications of Regression Discontinuity Design
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0cg3j928
Author
Shapiro, Eva
Publication Date
2019
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
SANTA CRUZ
PUBLIC POLICY APPLICATIONS OF REGRESSION
DISCONTINUITY DESIGN
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
ECONOMICS
by
Eva S. Shapiro
June 2019
The Dissertation of Eva S. Shapiro
is approved:
Professor Carlos Dobkin, Chair
Professor Robert Fairlie
Professor Justin Marion
Lori Kletzer
Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies
Copyright c© by
Eva S. Shapiro
2019
Table of Contents
List of Figures v
List of Tables vii
Abstract viii
Dedication xi
Acknowledgments xii
1 The California English Language Development Test, English Language
Learner Programs and Student Achievement 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Previous Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.1 California English Language Development Test . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.2 English Language Learner Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.3 Reclassification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4.1 Summary Statistics & Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.2 Data Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.5 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.6 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.8 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2 Consumer Preferences for Safety in the New Vehicle Purchasing De-
cision 66
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.2 Previous Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.3 The New Car Assessment Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.4 Data & Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
iii
2.5 Analysis & Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3 Test Driving the New Car Assessment Program 100
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.2 Previous Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.3 The New Car Assessment Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.4 Data & Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.5 Analysis & Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.5.1 FARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.5.2 TX CRIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Bibliography 150
iv
List of Figures
1.1 Distribution of Total CELDT Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.2 Distribution of Local Initial Total CELDT Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3 Distribution of Local Initial Listening & Speaking CELDT Score . . . . 27
1.4 Distribution of Kindergarten CELDT Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5 ALA Student Share by School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6 CST ELA Performance by ALA Enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.7 CST ELA Performance by ALA Enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.8 Distribution of Middle School GPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.9 CST ELA Score by CELDT Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.10 CST Math Score by CELDT Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.11 Middle School GPA by CELDT Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.12 PSAT Verbal Score by CELDT Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.13 PSAT Math Score by CELDT Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.14 First Stage - All Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.15 First Stage - Kindergarten Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.16 First Stage - Kindergarten Students, AY2008-2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.17 First Stage - ALA Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.18 First Stage - ALA Schools, AY2007-2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.19 First Stage - CELDT Listening Subtest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.20 First Stage - CELDT Speaking Subtest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.21 CELDT RD - CST Verbal Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.22 CELDT RD - CST Math Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.23 CELDT RD - Middle School GPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.1 Monroney Sticker for 2010 Subaru Impreza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.2 Density Test of Running Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.3 First Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.4 Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.5 MSRP Continuity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.6 Curb Weight Continuity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.7 MPG Continuity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
v
2.8 MSRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.9 Curb Weight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.10 Horsepower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.11 Results: Sales RD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.1 Distribution of NCAP Pr(Injury): FARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.2 Curb Weight vs. NCAP Pr(Injury) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.3 Max HP vs. NCAP Pr(Injury) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.4 FARS Crash Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.5 FARS Crashes: RD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.6 FARS Fatalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.7 FARS Vehicle Damage: Disabling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.8 FARS Vehicle Damage: Functional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.9 FARS Vehicle Damage: Minor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.10 FARS Vehicle Damage: None . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.11 FARS No Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.12 FARS Possible Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
3.13 FARS Non-Incapacitating Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.14 FARS Incapacitating Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.15 FARS Fatal Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.16 NCAP Pr(Injury) Distribution: TX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.17 TX Fatalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
3.18 TX Injuries: Incapacitating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.19 TX Injuries: Non-Incapacitating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.20 TX Injuries: Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
3.21 TX Injuries: Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
3.22 TX Injuries: None . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
3.23 TX Vehicle Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3.24 TX Crashes vs. NCAP Pr(Injury) (pooled) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
vi
List of Tables
1.1 Enrollment by Year and Grade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2 Students Taking CELDT by Year and Grade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3 Summary Kindergarten CELDT Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4 Summary Statistics: EO vs. ALA Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5 Summary Statistics: High vs. Low ALA-Enrollment Schools . . . . . . . 32
1.6 Probability of ALA Enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.7 First Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.8 CELDT RD - CST ELA & Math Scores and Middle School GPA . . . 56
1.9 Student Course Enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.1 Sales RD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.2 RD - Vehicle Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.3 RD + Event Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.1 FARS Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.2 TX Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.3 FARS Fatal Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.4 FARS Injury Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.5 FARS Fatalities by NCAP Crash Test Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.6 FARS Outcomes by Vehicle Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.7 FARS Vehicle Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.8 TX Occupant Injury Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.9 TX Vehicle Damage Outcomes (max=7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.10 TX Fatalities by NCAP Test Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.11 TX Occupant Injuries by NCAP Test Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
vii
Abstract
Public Policy Applications of Regression Discontinuity Design
by
Eva S. Shapiro
This thesis consists of three projects based on the application of Regression Discontinuity
Design (RDD) analysis to questions of public economics. Chapter 1 evaluates the effects
of English Language Learner programs on student achievement. There is a significant
and well-documented academic achievement gap between native English speakers and
English language learners (ELLs) in US public schools. [1] This gap is particularly
large in California, the US state with the largest population of ELLs. As a result
of being classified as having limited English proficiency, ELLs follow a different track
through the primary and secondary public school system in the U.S., according to
federal requirements and implemented at the state level. The effect of this differential
treatment of non-native English speakers is ambiguous, and the division of students into
separate tracks based on English lacks support in existing literature. I use longitudinal
microdata from a large northern California school district to estimate the effects of
ELL programs on student outcomes. Students in California are categorized as ELLs
based on performance on a standardized assessment of English language proficiency,
the California English Language Development Test (CELDT). Students classified as are
eligible for enrollment in a bilingual programs. For primary school students, this is
the Alternative Language Acquisition (ALA) program. I exploit discontinuity in the
viii
probability of enrollment in ALA at the threshold CELDT score for English proficiency.
I find that schools do not observe the rule for assignment to ALA based on CELDT
score.
Chapter 2 evaluates whether consumers respond to information about product
quality in the context of automobile safety. Consumer choice over new vehicles is a func-
tion of multiple vehicle attributes, including price, fuel efficiency and safety. However,
because vehicle safety is often correlated with other characteristics of vehicle quality,
estimating consumer preferences for safety over other attributes is empirically difficult.
Using a federal program in the United States that provides public safety ratings for
new passenger vehicles, I exploit discontinuity in the assignment of 5-star vehicle safety
ratings in continuous probability of injury measurements calculated based on crash test
performance. I evaluate whether new vehicle models that just miss a star threshold on
the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration’s New Car Assessment
Program’s 5-Star Rating scale experience lower national sales volumes relative to vhicles
that just exceed the ratings threshold.
Chapter 3 evaluates the accuracy of the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)
safety ratings in predicting real-world crash outcomes. Regulatory policies such as safety
standards for seat belts or airbags are aimed at improving vehicle safety and reducing
occupant injury and fatality rates, but may distort driver and occupant behavior. Vehi-
cle safety ratings can provide standardized, transparent and comparative information to
buyers. However, the value of any safety rating to consumers depends on the accuracy of
the rating regime. In the context of transportation policy, this means real-world loss of
ix
life, injury and property damage on a national scale. In the U.S., the National Highway
and Transportation Administration (NHTSA) evaluates the safety of all new vehicles
sold in the United States and publishes these safety ratings via the New Car Assessment
Program (NCAP), a program which is emulated internationally. Using a novel dataset
with the continuous underlying running variable, probability of injury, used to calculate
the 5-Star NCAP safety rating seen by consumers, I evaluate whether U.S. NCAP safety
ratings accurately predict real-world crash outcomes in terms of vehicular damage, per-
sonal injury and loss of life. Matching NCAP rating with crash report data from the
U.S. Fatality Analysis Reporting System and Texas’ Crash Records Information System,
I find minimal correlation between NCAP rating and real-world crash outcomes.
In summary, this dissertation applies Regression Discontinuity Design analysis
to public education policy in the context of the CELDT and to regulatory and trans-
portation policy in the context of NCAP. Successful implementation of these policy
regimes depends on accuracy of classification, whether of students or vehicles. Fail-
ures of evaluation and enforcement result in distortionary effects with real-world effects
on educational attainment and motor vehicle safety. Regression Discontinuity Design
provides a powerful tool for evaluating the true efficacy of public policies.
x
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Chapter 1
The California English Language
Development Test, English Language
Learner Programs and Student
Achievement
1.1 Introduction
The number of students in U.S. public schools who are non-native English
speakers is substantial and increasing. Nearly one quarter of the 35 million students in
U.S. public elementary schools and the 15 million students in U.S. public high schools
are Hispanic, and the majority of these students speak Spanish as their home language.
[1] Demographic trends such as birth and fertility rates among white and Hispanic
populations suggests that the number and fraction of non-native English speakers in
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the nations public schools will only increase over the next decade. [5]
Students for whom English is not a native language face acute obstacles in the
U.S. public education system that differentiate them from their English-speaking peers.
Their ability to benefit from schooling in English-speaking classrooms is compromised by
their lack of English language proficiency, often putting non-English speakers at a disad-
vantage relative to native English speakers. There is a significant and well-documented
achievement gap between native English speakers and native Spanish speakers. On both
the reading and writing components of the NAEP, there is a significant achievement gap
between Whites and Hispanics across all states. [1] Students of Spanish-speaking back-
grounds have higher dropout rates and are more likely to be placed in lower ability
classes and special education programs. [36]
These trends are reflected in long-term outcomes such as college enrollment,
career outcomes, and earnings, contributing to growing education and income inequality
between whites and Hispanics in the U.S. [32] Hispanics earn significantly lower wages
than whites, particularly for individuals with low levels of education levels. [?] Differ-
ences in language skill decrease substitutability between white and Hispanic workers,
further contributing to the wage gap between the two populations. [53]
This language-based gap in ability to learn raises questions of equal treatment
within the public education system. In an effort to recognize and aid these students,
national regulations require that students be tested in English language proficiency
and receive specialized assistance if they are identified as falling below the acceptable
threshold for English proficiency. These students are categorized as Limited English
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Proficient (LEP). 9% of U.S. primary and secondary school students in the 2010-2011
academic year were classified as LEP, and subsequently enrolled in language assistance
programs. [32] National funding for these English language learner (ELL) programs was
over $732 million in the 2012 fiscal year. [5]
California serves the most and has the highest percentage of English language
learners of any state. [1] 50% of CA public school students are Hispanic, more than
double the national average. The majority of these students speak Spanish at home,
and native Spanish speakers comprise the vast majority of all ELL students. [5] The
achievement gap in California between white and Hispanic students in both reading and
mathematics is significantly above the national average. [1] Hispanic students are half
as likely as white students to perform at a proficient level on the math section of the
California Standards Test (CST), while LEP students are a third as likely. Hispanic
students are two thirds as likely as white students to perform at a proficient level on
the English language section of the CST, while LEP students are a fifth as likely. This
achievement gap is not limited to standardized test scores. English language learners
are significantly more likely to be identified as having learning disabilities and placed
in special education programs. [77] These academic and program differences have long-
term consequences on student development and achievement. 70% of Hispanic students,
and 60% of LEP students, graduate from high school in California, relative to 85% of
white students.
Unsurprisingly, idenfitying and educating English learners is a central and
contentious issue in California. Funding for English learner acquisition in California was
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over $160 million in 2012. [32] However, program choice is left largely up to individual
counties and districts, and the efficacy of programs targeted at ELLs is ambiguous. A
student is classified as an English Language Learner (ELL) based on his or her score
on the California Language Development Test (CELDT). The test is administered to
non-native English speaking students upon enrollment in the school district. Students
who score below the threshold for English proficiency on the CELDT are classified as
ELLs. These students are more likely to be placed in a bilingual classroom among peers
with significantly lower academic achievement. Classification of a student as an ELL
has implications for school assessment criteria and funding. However, my study does not
consider the effect of policy and funding incentives on school behavior. I focus on the
effect of classification as an ELL on a student’s probability of enrollment in a bilingual
program.
California Proposition 227, passed in 1998, established English Only (EO) as
the primary method of instruction for ELLs. However, programs available to ELLs
continue to be designed and implemented at the level of the individual school district.
In the school district that I consider in this study, students classified as ELL are eligible
for enrollment in a specialized bilingual program, Alternative Language Acquisition
(ALA). ALA provides a separate classroom for instruction in Spanish by a certified
bilingual instructor. The relative merits of EO and ALA for student development are
heavily debated.
Proponents of separate ELL classrooms in which students are instructed in
their native language argue students learn best in their native language. In contrast,
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critics of bilingual education programs argue that students placed in non-English class-
rooms are segregated from their English-speaking peers and may never develop the
English language skills necessary to succeed in mainstream English classrooms in public
schools. Given this disparity in support for ELLs in California and across the U.S., the
question of how education policy be structured to best serve ELLs and decrease the long-
term and systematic achievement and wage gap between whites and Hispanics seems
central to future education policy. Education is a critical component of human capital
development, suggesting that placement in ELL programs early in life may have long-
term effects on individual achievement, career outcomes, and wealth. If tracking stu-
dents into native English-speaking and non-native English speaking cohorts contributes
to and exacerbates the achievement gap between the white and Hispanic students, the
efficacy of bilingual education programs in California, and across the U.S., may need to
be reevaluated.
Despite the attention that bilingual education has received in the media and
political discussions, relatively little analysis has been done to determine the effect of
programs such as ALA. Current research in this area is limited due to self selection and
the lack of control groups for bilingual programs. Most estimates of program efficacy
are limited by the fact that students are placed in ELL programs based on English
proficiency, which is correlated with other observable and unobservable characteristics
such as innate and cognitive ability, language acquisition skills, parental support and
home environment. This can downwardly bias estimates of the effect of ELL programs
on long-term academic outcomes. As a result, isolating the true causal effect of bilingual
5
programs from the contribution of individual student characteristics is often impossible.
This difficulty in estimating the causal effect of bilingual programs on student achieve-
ment is compounded by the lack of detailed longitudinal data on student demographics,
program enrollment, and academic outcomes.
I overcome these limitations by using a new, longitudinal, student-level data
set from an undisclosed large school district in California. In this district, students
classified as ELLs can be enrolled in either an English Only (EO) classroom in which
they are instructed entirely in English alongside native English speakers, or are enrolled
in an Academic Language Acquisition (ALA) program in which they are instructed
in Spanish by teachers with bilingual certification in a separate classroom. Eligibility
for ALA is determined by performance on the California Language Development Test
(CELDT).
In order to evaluate the causal effect of ALA on long-term student outcomes,
I use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD). The fuzzy RDD method exploits
discontinuity in probability of enrollment in ALA at the threshold score for English pro-
ficiency on the CELDT. Students scoring just above and below the proficiency threshold
are likely to exhibit similar observed and unobserved characteristics that are correlated
with academic achievement. As a result, whether a student scores above or below the
CELDT threshold can be used as an instrumental variable for ALA enrollment in order
to estimate the causal effect of ALA on academic outcomes such as course grades and
standardized test scores.
I find that students enrolled in ALA score significantly lower on both CST
6
English Language Arts and Mathematics standardized test scores. The CST is an
annual test administered to all students in grades 2 through 11. I report results for
CST grades 2-8 scores. ALA students also achieve significantly lower grades in middle
school. However, schools in this district appear to systematically violate the rule for
assignment to ALA. Less than 50% of students who score below the threshold for English
proficiency on the CELDT are enrolled in ALA. This is robust to conditioning on ALA
availability by school and to demographic and age subgroups. This level of fuzziness in
my RD design restricts my ability to draw conclusions about the causal effect of ALA
vs. EO programs on students achievement.
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as followed. Section 2 provides a
brief review of the literature on language development programs and student achieve-
ment. Section 3 discusses the institutional context and background of ELL programs in
California and the CELDT. Section 4 describes the data used and provides summary
statistics. Section 5 introduces the model and methodology that I use to isolate the
effects of English language development programs on student outcomes. Section 6 pro-
vides a preliminary analysis of the data. Section 7 concludes. Section 8 discusses future
work in this area, and Section 9 provides a timeline for progression.
1.2 Previous Literature
Evaluation of bilingual education programs is compromised by the availability
of longitudinal, student-level data and endogeneity of covariates with assignment to
7
programs. For these reasons, there are a limited number of studies evaluating the
causal effects of bilingual education programs on student achievement. However, there
is a rich literature on tracking and peer effects.
The effect of tracking students into separate academic programs based on
English proficiency is unclear in education economics theory. Tracking high and low
performing students separately could be harmful if less qualified teachers are assigned
to low performing students, as well as if there are positive peer effects from being in
the same class as high-performing students. However, tracking could be beneficial by
allowing teachers to focus on heterogeneous student needs and by modifying teacher
incentives. This raises the question of whether lower achieving students or students
of a non-English background do better when placed among similarly low-achieving or
non-English-speaking peers, when a teacher can focus on their needs and design an
adequately paced curriculum for their language acquisition, or whether lower achieving
or Spanish-speaking students learn more effectively among higher achieving or English-
speaking peers. A number of studies have focused on peer effects and tracking students
by academic ability.
Duflo et al. (2008) consider a tracking experiment in 210 schools in Western
Kenya. [31] Schools were given funding to offer a second class section, and students
were allocated to class sections either randomly or based on ability. The authors find
significant, positive, and persistent effects of tracking in both the high-performing and
low-performing class sections. They argue that these effects are due largely to the
behavioral responses of teachers. The authors find no support for the hypothesis that
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tracking might harm lower ability students by removing them from classrooms with
higher ability peers.
A number of studies in the U.S. have focused specifically on the effect of track-
ing students with particular groups of their peers. Burke & Sass (2013) analyze class-
room peer effects on student achievement. [17] Using longitudinal data for students
in grades 3-10 in Florida public schools, they find evidence of peer effects using non-
linear models. Their results suggest that there is an optimal allocation of students to
classrooms that would maximize individual student achievement.
Carrell et al. (2011) analyze peer effects using students at the U.S. Air Force
Academy (USAFA). [21] The authors assign half of entering freshmen in 2007 and
2008 at the USAFA into peer groups optimally designed to maximize the grades of the
students predicted to be in the lowest third of incoming students in terms of academic
achievement. The remaining half of students are randomly assigned to squadrons. How-
ever, the authors find that students in the treatment group saw a statistically significant
reduction in grades if they were in the lowest third, a statistically significant increase
in grades if they were in the middle third, and no effect if they were in the highest
third. The authors argue that this is due to sub-group sorting dynamics that prevent
the treatment cohorts from functioning as predicted to benefit the lowest achieving stu-
dents. This scenario is unlikely in kindergarten and elementary school classrooms where
the ability of students to identify and select playmates on ability, at least within the
classroom setting in the absence of parents, is minimal, and in language development
settings, in which peer choice is likely dependent on language proficiency.
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Fewer studies have dealt with tracking in the context of language development.
Callahan (2005) uses data from a rural high school in northern California to evaluate
the effect of track placement on ELLs’ GPA, standardized test scores, and performance
on the California High School Exit Exam (CAHSEE). [18] Track is defined according to
the proportion of classes on a student’s transcript meeting college entry requirements.
However, students are not randomly assigned to different tracks, and her analysis suffers
from a small sample size (n = 355). Cho (2012) finds evidence that ELLs have negative
peer effects on reading achievement as measured by test scores. [24] This raises questions
of equity and fairness; if all students benefit from being in a classroom with the highest
achieving students, are these high-achieving students hurt by being put in a classroom
with lower-achieving peers? What does this suggest for ELL programs? Should the least
proficient English speakers be put in classrooms with similar students who are learning
at the same pace, or which native English speakers with whom they can interact to
improve their language ability?
Although English language development is debated heavily in educational, lin-
guistic, and child development literature, there is limited research on the effects of
language development and bilingual education programs using econometric methods
and student-level data. The California Department of Education has published several
studies on language development programs. However, these reports have been primarily
program evaluations and cost benefit studies, rather than econometric analyses. Mitchell
et al. (1997), in a report for the California Educational Research Cooperative on the
Santa Ana Unified School District (SAUSD), review special programs for language de-
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velopment. [59] They find that students enrolled in specialized language programs are
more likely to achieve English fluency than students enrolled in mainstream classrooms,
and that students make more rapid progress transitioning between proficiency levels at
low levels than at high levels. However, this report is mainly summary statistics and
takes no steps to address endogeneity of assignment to special programs for language
development.
Parrish et al. (2006), in a report to the California Department of Education
on the effects of Proposition 227, compare English-only students to ELLs and reclas-
sified ELLs using achievement on the Stanford Achievement Test, Version 9 (SAT9)
and California Standards Test (CST). [61] Using average student test scores for all stu-
dents in California from 1998-2001 by language classification, they find that the greatest
achievement for ELLs was in bilingual programs. However, they use aggregated rather
than student-level data over a short assessment period, and are unable to include de-
mographic controls.
Several studies focus on the resource and achievment gap between ELL and
English-speaking students. Gandara et al. (2003) argue that ELLs receive unequal
education services such as assignment to less qualified teachers, inferior facilities and
curriculum, segregation from English-speaking peers, and assessment via invalid instru-
ments. [35] Using the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS) of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, the American Institutes for Research Implementation of Proposition
227 Study, and data from the California Department of Education, the authors argue
that the academic achievement of ELLs falls considerably behind that of native English
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speakers. They show a significant achievement gap between English learners and En-
glish speakers on the SAT9 between 1998 and 2002. Using the ECLS data, the authors
argue that this is partly attributable to the fact that ELLs begin kindergarten signif-
icantly behind English-speakers in terms of language development, mathematics and
general knowledge assessments. Further, the authors find that ELLs are more likely to
be placed in special education programs. If this is correct, then ELL students are at a
significant disadvantage relative to their English-speaking peers, and estimates of the
effects of ELL programs on academic outcomes will be downwardly biased.
A number of studies look specifically at the effect of two-way bilingual programs
on academic outcomes. Shneyderman and Abella (2009) study the effects of a TWBI
program on Spanish language proficiency and reading and mathematics achievement in
English in a school district in the Southeastern U.S. [75] Using a four academic-year
period, the authors find that students enrolled in the TWBI program had reading and
mathematics achievement as high as or higher than similar students not enrolled in the
program. Although the authors construct a synthetic comparison group via a matching
technique, their results are compromised by selection bias and endogeneity, upwardly
biasing their estimates of the effect of TWBI programs on student achievement.
Alanis (2000) studies the effects of a TWBI program in Texas on linguistic and
academic achievement. [9] Her sample incudes fifth-grade students of Mexican origin who
were either native Spanish or native English speakers and were enrolled in the TWBI
program for a minimum of three years. She finds that TWBI students performed at
the same level or at a higher level than students who did not participate in the TWBI
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program on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS). However, her sample
size is only 85 and, similarly to Shneyderman and Abella, because students are not
randomly assigned to the program, her study is compromised by issued of selection bias
that upwardly bias her estimates of the program effects.
Most relevant to my analysis are studies that rely on natural experiments and
regression discontinuity design (RDD) settings to evaluate the effects of ELL programs.
Barnett et al. (2007) compare the effects of a two-way bilingual immersion (TWBI) and
an English-only (EO) preschool program on learning in an undisclosed city in the North-
east. [13] Three- and four-year olds from both native English- and Spanish-speaking
backgrounds were randomly assigned to either the an EO program or a TWBI program
that alternated weekly between English and Spanish. The authors find significant im-
provement in Spanish vocabulary among native Spanish speakers in the TWBI relative
to the EO program, but otherwise mixed effects. However, the authors are unable to
track academic outcomes beyond a year after initial assignment, leaving the long-term
effects of TWBI programs unclear.
Further, these TWBI programs are not directly comparable to the ALA pro-
grams in the school district I consider. Students in ALA are taught alsmost entirely in
Spanish, particularly in younger grades. In this sense, ALA is not a strictly bilingual
program. The school district I consider does have a TWBI program, but only a small
minority students are enrolled, and the TWBI classroom languages are generally not
Spanish, but other languages such as Mandarin and French.
Chin et al. (2012) uses an RDD based on class size to evaluate the effect of
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bilingual education programs in Texas. The authors investigates a Texas education law
requiring that a school district offer bilingual education when its enrollment of limited
English proficient (LEP) students in a given elementary grade and language is at least
twenty. [23] Using a RDD around this cutoff, the authors estimate the causal effect of
enrollment in a two-way bilingual program on academic achievement by LEP and non-
LEP students. They find no effects of bilingual education programs on standardized test
scores of native Spanish speaking students, but some evidence of positive spillovers to
native English speakers. This could be due to positive peer effects for LEP students from
having English speaking peers, further suggesting a benefit of EO over ELL programs.
Robinson (2011), using data from California, also uses an RDD to evaluate the
effect of language development programs. However, he focuses on the effect of reclas-
sification of ELL students as Reclassified English Proficient (REP) on student achieve-
ment. [67] His sample uses data from an undisclosed district in California. Because
reclassification generally involves a change in instruction, including decreased language
development support, this can have an adverse effect on student achievement. The
author uses a binding score cutoff in reclassification eligibility to evaluate these effects
using a sample of students in grades 4 through 10. He finds no effect of reclassification
on academic outcomes of ELL students. However, this could be due to positive peer
effects associated with being enrolled in an English only classroom, suggesting the non-
EO programs are less beneficial to the English language and academic development of
ELLs than EO classes. Further, he is unable to analyze the effects of ELL programs on
students first enrolling in the district at younger ages, and his results likely suffer from
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endogeneity from previous years of schooling in the district. In addition, his sample
does not focus on Hispanic students; over one third of the ELL students in his sample
are Asian. Finally, Robinson only looks at student outcomes up to one year from the
date of reclassification, and is unable to observe long-term outcomes such as CST scores
more than a year from the date of reclassification, middle school grades, or PSAT score.
Finally, Matsudaira (2009) also uses a RDD around the ELL reclassification
threshold using data from an undisclosed large urban school district in the northeast
U.S. [55] As in the California school district I study, students enrolling in the district
Matsudaira studies are given a language assessment test if they report on a home sur-
vey that the students native language or the language spoken at home is not English.
Students scoring below the 40th percentile on this test are classified as Limited English
Proficient (LEP). The ultimate decision of whether these students are enrolled in a
bilingual education program is then up to the individual students teacher and parents,
and subject to availability at the students school. He finds no effect of reclassifica-
tion on academic outcomes within two years of relcassification testing date. He finds
that students scoring below the threshold for English proficiency are 90 percent more
likely to be placed in a bilingual program. However, he finds no difference in academic
achievement in reading and math between the two groups. Although I do not focus on
the effects of reclassification in this paper, future work and data availability makes this
a potential extension of my research.
To my knowledge, no studies employing econometric techniques use California
data to evaluate the effect of initial placement in ALA on long-term academic outcomes.
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[33] Access to a new, comprehensive, student-level, longitudinal dataset from a large
California school district provides a unique and novel opportunity to evaluate the effect
of bilingual education programs on students’ academic achievement.
1.3 Institutional Context
1.3.1 California English Language Development Test
U.S. states receive federal funding for ELL programs under Part A of Title III,
the English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement
Act. Under the 2001 No Child Left Behind policy, schools receiving Title III federal
funds are required to conduct annual tests of reading and mathematics for all students.
Schools may exempt English language learners (ELLs) from achievement testing in
English for up to three years, but are required to assess English language proficiency
annually and without an exemption period. [36] In California, this assessment of ELLs
is done via the California English Language Development Test (CELDT). The CELDT
was developed by CTB-McGraw Hill to fulfill California Assembly Bill 748 (1997) and
California Senate Bill 638 (1999), which require schools to assess the English language
development of English learners, and has been administered to ELLs in California since
2001. According to California Education Code, Section 60810(d), the purposes of the
CELDT are: (1) To identify pupils who are limited English proficient. (2) To determine
the level of English language proficiency of pupils who are limited English proficient.
(3) To assess the progress of limited-English-proficient pupils in acquiring the skills of
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listening, reading, speaking, and writing in English.
The CELDT is administered to all students in California whose native language
is not English. The exam is administered either as an initial assessment (IA) to students
newly enrolled in the district, as determined by a home language survey given to parents,
or as an annual assessment (AA) to students classified as Limited English Proficient
(LEP) based on a previous year’s CELDT score. As a result, many students have
CELDT scores for multiple years, beginning with their year of enrollment in the district.
The CELDT exam has four subtests: listening, speaking, reading, and writing.
Grades K-1 are assessed only in listening and speaking, while grades 2-12 are assessed
in all categories. Prior to 2006, the listening and speaking subsections were combined
into a single Listening & Speaking (L & S) section. These subtests contained questions
in the following areas:
1. Listening and Speaking: following oral directions, phonemic awareness and con-
trol, oral vocabulary, and story retelling. These were in the form of multiple choice
and dichotomous constructed response.
2. Reading: word analysis, fluency and vocabulary, comprehension and analysis.
These were in the form of multiple choice.
3. Writing: grammar and structure, writing sentences, and short comprehension.
These were in the form of multiple choice, short answer constructed response, and
extending writing constructed response.
Students are assessed along a continuum of five levels: Beginning (1), Early
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Intermediate (2) Intermediate (3), Early Advanced (4) and Advanced (5).
1. Advanced: Students performing at this level of English language proficiency com-
municate effectively with various audiences on a wide range of familiar and new
topics to meet social and academic demands. In order to attain the English profi-
ciency level of their native English-speaking peers, further linguistic enhancement
and refinement are necessary.
2. Early Advanced: Students performing at this level of English language proficiency
begin to combine the elements of the English language in complex, cognitively
demanding situations and are able to use English as a means for learning in other
academic areas.
3. Intermediate: Students performing at this level of English language proficiency
begin to tailor the English language skills they have been taught to meet their
immediate communication and learning needs.
4. Early Intermediate: Students performing at this level of English language profi-
ciency start to respond with increasing ease to more varied communication tasks.
5. Beginning: Students performing at this level of English language proficiency may
demonstrate little or no receptive or productive English skills. They may be able
to respond to some communication tasks.
For a student to be classified as English proficient, he or she must achieve
an overall CELDT score of at least Level 4 (Early Advanced) and score at least Level
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3 (intermediate) on each of the individual subtests: listening, speaking, reading, and
writing (or, for Kindergarten and first grade students, just listening and speaking).
1.3.2 English Language Learner Programs
At the elementary school level, students who score Beginning, Early Interme-
diate or Intermediate on their initial assessment (IA) of the CELDT are eligible for
enrollment in a bilingual education program, Alternative Language Acquisition (ALA).
ALA classes are taught entirely in Spanish and are only at the elementary school level.
ELL students who are not enrolled in ALA receive English-Only instruction, also known
as Structured English Immersion (SEI). In theory, EO courses are taught nearly entirely
in English, with the curriculum and presentation designed for students who are learning
English. [3] However, EO instruction is done within the context of a mainstream English
classroom, in which ELLs are taught alongside native English speakers. The exact level
of instruction customized to students learning English varies by school, classroom, and
teacher, and is not observable in my data.
Proposition 227 of 1998 established EO as the dominant instructional approach
for English language development in California. However, at the time ELL students
enroll in the district and receive their initial CELDT level, their parents are provided
with information about ALA and EO and are able to choose the option they want
for their child. All 27 elementary schools in the district have EO programs, but only
thirteen have both EO and ALA. As a result, under the Elementary Transfers for ALA
Bilingual Program, parents whose children are initially enrolled in an EO program or
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whose assigned school does not have an ALA program can apply for an Exception
Waiver for a transfer to an ALA classroom or school with available space. If no space
is available, the student is placed in an EO classroom. Although parents can choose
to have their child enter a mainstream English classroom, most parents who are new
to the district and themselves English learners choose to keep their child in an ELL
program in which they are able to communicate with the teacher themselves in their
native language. Nonetheless, the role of parent choice introduces significant selection
bias.
Students enrolled ELL programs who reach middle school while still being
classified as an ELL enter English Language Development (ELD) or, for students scoring
at the intermediate level, Specially Designed Academic Instruction in English (SDAIE)
programs. At the high school level, SDAIE students are enrolled in a special section for
regular English classes. Although ELL programs at the middle and high school level
are not the focus of this paper, future work using this data could consider ELD and
SDAIE programs. However, given previous exposure to ALA and EO programs, there
are empirical challenges to disentangling the effects of ELD and SDAIE programs from
earlier language development programs.
1.3.3 Reclassification
Students who initially score below proficient on their initial CELDT exam
can become Reclassified English Proficient (REP) if their English proficiency improves.
Students who have scored below proficient on the CELDT continue to take the exam
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each year as an AA. Once students reach the Early Advanced level, they may qualify for
reclassification depending on their CST ELA performance and whether they pass the
District’s writing performance-based assessment. In order to be reclassified as English
proficient (REP), a student must achieve an overall CELDT score at least at the Early
Advanced level, and individual subtest scores at least at the Intermediate level for all
categories.
In order to be eligible for bilingual reclassification, students must meet the
following criteria:
1. Language proficiency at least Limited English;
2. Pass on the most recent Writing Performance Based Assessment (PBA);
3. Most recent CST ELA Scaled Score of 317 or higher;
4. Latest CELDT total level of early advanced or advanced;
5. Latest CELDT listening, speaking, reading and writing subtest levels of interme-
diate, early advanced, or advanced.
I do not focus on English language proficiency reclassification in this paper.
However, future work using this data has the potential to evaluate the effect and timing
of reclassification on student achievement.
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1.4 Data
I use a new dataset from an undisclosed, large northern California school dis-
trict, which I will refer to as (NCSD). In California, there are 1,036 school districts and
over 10,000 schools. NCSD provides a large, representative sample of the ethnic and
language diversity of these districts and schools public schools. NCSD has an annual
enrollment of over 30,000 students. Nearly three fourths of NCSD students are from
minority backgrounds, and over half of students in the district are Hispanic. NCSD has
been historically segregated along racial and language lines; in the mid-1980s, however,
a court order led to the de-segregation of the North end of the district, which is of lower
income and Hispanic population, and the South end of the district, which is predomi-
nantly White and Asian and of higher socioeconomic status. Nearly a quarter of NCSD
students are ELLs.
NCSD is comprised of 27 elementary schools, 8 middle schools, and 8 high
schools. The NCSD dataset provides detailed information on 112,212 distinct students
enrolled in the school district between 1997 and 2012. The dataset, which tracks indi-
vidual students longitudinally over time as they progress through the district, provides
data on enrollment, program participation, demographic characteristics, course infor-
mation and enrollment, teacher information and credentials, school information, course
grades and grade point average (GPA), course schedule, standardized test scores, in-
cluding PSAT and SAT, CAHSEE scores, graduation status, and college enrollment,
among other characteristics.
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1.4.1 Summary Statistics & Figures
Table 1.1 shows NCSD enrollment numbers. Enrollment in NCSD is relatively
consistent across all years 2004-2010, at approximately 30,000 students. For primary
school students, in Kindergarten through Grade 5, enrollment is also relatively consis-
tent, at approximately 13,000 for 2004-2010. Most students are observed over multiple
years and grades.
Table 1.1: Enrollment by Year and Grade
Grade
K 1 2 3 4 5 K-12
2004-2005 2,304 1,995 2,107 1,966 2,086 2,306 28,123
2005-2006 2,214 2,004 2,159 1,975 1,976 2,243 27,675
2006-2007 2,274 2,010 2,107 1,991 1,901 2,167 27,288
2007-2008 2,307 2,179 2,163 2,089 1,980 2,205 27,719
2008-2009 2,424 2,129 2,284 2,046 2,175 2,215 28,439
2009-2010 2,349 1,819 2,266 2,133 1,899 2,132 28,312
Total 13,872 12,136 13,086 12,200 12,017 13,268 167,556
Table 1.2 shows the number of students taking the CELDT by academic year
and grade. There is some variation in number of students taking the CELDT across
years and grades. After the 2006-2007 academic year, the number of students taking the
CELDT is highest for Kindergarten students and decreases for higher grade levels. The
vast majority (83%) of students taking the CELDT are of low socioeconomic status.
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Table 1.2: Students Taking CELDT by Year and Grade
Grade
K 1 2 3 4 5 K-12
2004-2005 377 486 613 700 940 884 10,592
2005-2006 713 726 873 993 863 1,097 10,556
2006-2007 884 968 1,279 995 1,074 908 10,672
2007-2008 1,155 1,249 1,068 1,090 843 758 11,043
2008-2009 1,401 798 1,096 759 684 564 11,124
2009-2010 1,032 1,006 765 610 449 396 9,002
Total 5,562 5,233 5,694 5,147 4,853 4,607 73,603
Table 1.3 gives summary statistics on CELDT scores for all years, 2004-2010,
by test section for elementary and Kindergarten students. Scores are normalized to the
threshold value for English proficiency for each year, grade level, and subtest. Kinder-
garten students have significantly lower scores, even allowing for normalization by grade
level, across all categories in which they take the test, which are listening and speaking.
Prior to 2006, this was given as a single subtest, Listening & Speaking (L&S), while
later administrations of the test divided listening and speaking into separate subtests.
Kindergarten and first grade students do not take the reading and writing subtests.
Elementary School Students Kindergarten Students
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total 11438 -35.22 89.83 -351 224 2271 -43.83 99.59 -326 204
L & S 449 -35.71 93.01 -275 233 52 -69.31 86.39 -238 112
Listening 6480 22.19 91.16 -269 306 1752 7.01 89.48 -189 256
Speaking 6696 31.39 109.71 -319 315 1749 9.74 120.15 -265 315
Reading 4068 -3.63 72.48 -291 209 - - - - -
Writing 4140 5.58 80.79 -401 223 - - - - -
Table 1.3: Summary Kindergarten CELDT Scores
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Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of CELDT total score for all students taking
the CELDT in all grades and years. All scoring types are represented: state initial
and state annual, transfer initial and transfer annual, and local initial and local annual.
Because students taking the CELDT are native Spanish speakers, it is not surprising
that a majority of students taking the CELDT score below the threshold level for
English proficiency, and there appears to be some clustering at the bottom of the score
distribution.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Total CELDT Score
Students take the CELDT when they are first enrolled in the district, usually
in Kindergarten. This yields an initial CELDT score. Students continue to take the
CELDT each year until they achieve English proficiency; this yields annual CELDT
scores. In addition, CELDT scores are graded by the state Department of Education
for official scoring. It is these official, state scores that affect how a student is assessed on
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standardized state achievement tests and the funding for ELL programs that a district or
school receives. However, it can take several months for the state score to be calculated.
As a result, districts provide a local score at the time that the CELDT is administered.
It is this local score that determines a student’s eligibility for ALA. Thus, the score of
greatest relevance for the initial placement of Kindergarten students first enrolling in the
district in ALA or EO is the local initial (LI) score. Figure 1.2 shows the distribution
of LI CELDT total score for all students taking the CELDT in all grades and years.
Because the majority of LI scores are for Kindergarten students, it is not surprising that
the vast majority of scores are below the proficiency threshold. Again, there is evidence
of clustering at the bottom end of the distribution.
0
.0
02
.0
04
.0
06
D
en
si
ty
0 200 400 600 800
LI CELDT Total Score
LI CELDT Total Score
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Local Initial Total CELDT Score
Students receive a total CELDT score, as well as individual scores for each
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subtest. In order to be classified as English proficient, students must score above the
threshold in each subtest and on the overall CELDT. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution
of LI CELDT scores on the Listening & Speaking (L & S) subtest. This subtest was only
offered prior to 2006; after 2006, the L & S subtest was divided into separate listening
and speaking components. The vast majority of students taking the CELDT prior to
2006, when the L & S subtest was offered, failed this subtest. This may have been one
motivation in the reform of the CELDT in 2006.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Local Initial Listening & Speaking CELDT Score
Most students enter the public school system in Kindergarten. Kindergarten
students for whom English is not the native language take the CELDT, and receive an
initial score. As shown in Figure 1.4, Kindergarten students are particularly likely to
fail the CELDT, and there is significant clustering at the bottom end of the score distri-
bution. This is not surprising, given that a significant number of non-English speaking
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students enter the public school system with limited English proficiency. However, it
also means that most of these non-native English speakers are immediately placed into
ALA programs as a result of their CELDT score, an initial placement that has long-term
effects on students’ trajectories through and performance in higher grade levels.
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of Kindergarten CELDT Score
Table 1.4 provides summary statistics on demographic information, program
participation, CELDT scores, and academic outcomes for students enrolled in English
Only (EO) programs and those enrolled in Alternative Language Acquisition (ALA).
There are significant differences between EO and ALA students. ALA students are more
likely to have taken the CELDT in a slightly later test year, perhaps due to to increased
Hispanic and Spanish-speaking populations in the district. Interestingly, ALA students
also seem to take the CELDT slightly later in the year, and later in the month, though
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the difference is small. ALA students also take the CELDT, on average, at a slightly
higher grade. This may suggest that students in ALA are less likely to reclassified as
English proficient, and thus more likely to have to continue to take the CELDT at
higher grade levels.
English Only ALA Diff: EO - ALA
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Diff p
Test Year 18211 2006.95 2.49 12161 2007.10 2.39 −0.15∗∗∗ 0.00
Test Month 18211 9.94 2.02 12161 10.00 1.81 −0.06∗∗∗ 0.01
Test Day 18211 9.63 10.17 12161 10.29 10.60 −0.66∗∗∗ 0.00
Grade 35052 2.03 1.80 12274 2.08 1.76 −0.05∗∗∗ 0.01
Female 35,052 0.49 0.50 18211 0.50 0.50 −0.01∗∗ 0.04
LSES 35052 0.49 0.50 12274 0.92 0.27 −0.42∗∗∗ 0.00
Parent’s Ed. 24690 3.34 1.57 8691 2.54 1.99 0.80∗∗∗ 0.00
Hispanic 35,052 0.51 0.50 12274 0.99 0.09 −0.49∗∗∗ 0.00
Spanish 35052 0.30 0.46 12274 0.86 0.35 −0.56∗∗∗ 0.00
GATE 35,052 0.15 0.36 12274 0.07 0.26 0.08∗∗∗ 0.00
Special Ed. 35052 0.08 0.28 12274 0.07 0.26 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00
% ALA 35052 0.24 0.28 12274 0.59 0.11 −0.35∗∗∗ 0.00
Level 18211 3.20 1.20 12161 2.42 1.19 0.78∗∗∗ 0.00
Total Score 5,003 -16.62 77.53 3,194 -74.09 103.42 57.47∗∗∗ 0.00
L & S 214 -22.43 85.32 126 -69.57 106.65 47.14∗∗∗ 0.00
Listening 2,860 35.53 83.12 1,995 4.67 102.22 30.86∗∗∗ 0.00
Speaking 2,955 52.88 94.51 2,010 -4.00 127.20 56.89∗∗∗ 0.00
Reading 1759 6.79 70.25 1,191 -16.63 76.90 23.43∗∗∗ 0.00
Writing 1807 20.78 72.02 1168 -15.71 90.62 36.49∗∗∗ 0.00
CST ELA 35052 435.08 1034.29 12274 410.19 1035.57 24.90∗∗∗ 0.00
CST Math 35052 445.52 986.39 12274 415.00 942.56 30.52∗∗∗ 0.00
MS GPA 13461 2.63 0.89 4,508 2.45 0.79 0.17∗∗∗ 0.00
Table 1.4: Summary Statistics: EO vs. ALA Students
ALA students are more likely to be male, though the difference is small. ALA
students are significantly more likely to be of low socioeconomic status (LSES); 92% of
ALA students are of LSES, relative to only 49% of EO students. ALA students also
have parents with lower levels of education, on average. Unsurprisingly, ALA students
are significantly more likely to be Hispanic and speak Spanish as their native language;
99% of ALA students are Hispanic, relative to 51% of EO students, and 86% of ALA
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students speak Spanish as their native language, relative to 30% of EO students.
ALA students are half as likely to be enrolled in the Gifted and Talented
Education (GATE) program. ALA students are slightly less likely to be enrolled in a
Special Education program; however, this may be due to the fact that schools that do
not offer ALA programs place students of low English proficiency in special education
programs. Students in ALA programs have on average 59% of the students at their
school enrolled in ALA, relative to an average of 24% for EO students.
It is clear that students in EO classrooms score significantly higher across all
subtests of the CELDT and on total score. EO students score, on average, nearly an
entire level higher than ALA students. However, the gap between EO and ALA students
is highest in speaking, and lowest in reading. Finally, EO students perform significantly
higher on the California Standards Test (CST) in both English Language Arts (ELA)
and Math. This suggests that differences between the EO and ALA programs are not
limited to language development, but also influence other subjects, such as mathematics.
EO students also have higher Middle School GPA, on average.
Not all schools in NCSD offer ALA programs. Figure 1.5 shows the distribution
of schools based on proportion of students at the school enrolled in ALA. A number
of schools offer no ALA programs. Among schools that do offer ALA programs, most
schools have over 50% of students enrolled in ALA. In order to evaluate the effect of ALA
vs. EO programs on student achievement, I consider schools that offer ALA programs
separately from those that do not.
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Figure 1.5: ALA Student Share by School
Schools that offer ALA vary significantly from those that do not. Table 1.5 pro-
vides summary statistics on demographic information, program participation, CELDT
scores, and academic outcomes for schools that offer ALA (high) and those that do not
(low). Adjusting the threshold of between low and high above 0 does not significantly
change the results. Students at ALA schools take the CELDT in a sightly later aaca-
demic year and later in the month. Students at ALA schools also take the CELDT, on
average, at a later grade. Students at ALA schools are slightly more likely to be female.
Students at ALA schools are significantly more likely to be of low socioeco-
nomic status (LSES). 81% of students at ALA schools are LSES, relative to 29% at
non-ALA schools. Students at ALA shools are also significantly more likely to be His-
panic and to speak Spanish as their native language. 84% of students at ALA schools
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are Hispanic, relative to 32% at non-ALA schools; and 62% of students at ALA schools
speak Spanish as their home language, relative to 16% at non-ALA schools.
Low High Diff: Low - High
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Diff p
Test Year 8152 2006.65 2.56 22220 2007.14 2.40 −0.50∗∗∗ 0.00
Test Month 8152 9.98 1.98 22220 9.95 1.92 0.02 0.34
Test Day 8152 8.43 9.55 22220 10.43 10.58 −2.00∗∗∗ 0.00
Grade 18918 1.94 1.78 28408 2.12 1.78 −0.18∗∗∗ 0.00
Female 18918 0.48 0.50 28408 0.49 0.50 −0.01∗∗∗ 0.01
LSES 18918 0.29 0.45 28408 0.81 0.39 −0.52∗∗∗ 0.00
Parent’s Ed. 13553 3.77 1.32 19828 2.69 1.82 1.08∗∗∗ 0.00
Hispanic 18918 0.32 0.47 28408 0.84 0.37 −0.52∗∗∗ 0.00
Spanish 18918 0.17 0.37 28408 0.62 0.48 −0.46∗∗∗ 0.00
GATE 18918 0.21 0.41 28408 0.08 0.27 0.13∗∗∗ 0.00
Special Ed. 18918 0.08 0.27 28408 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.16
% ALA 18918 0.00 0.00 28408 0.55 0.13 −0.55∗∗∗ 0.00
Level 8152 3.46 1.17 22220 2.68 1.22 0.78∗∗∗ 0.00
Total Score 2383 -1.02 73.35 5814 -54.59 95.48 53.56∗∗∗ 0.00
L & S 101 -7.14 79.51 239 -53.75 99.62 46.61∗∗∗ 0.00
Listening 1235 45.02 81.79 3620 15.29 94.97 29.73∗∗∗ 0.00
Speaking 1296 61.77 95.05 3669 18.58 115.90 43.19∗∗∗ 0.00
Reading 678 17.76 71.51 2272 -8.76 73.52 26.52∗∗∗ 0.00
Writing 678 36.33 72.70 2297 -2.37 82.25 38.70∗∗∗ 0.00
CST ELA 18918 525.26 1260.18 28408 391.19 881.48 134.07∗∗∗ 0.00
CST Math 18918 526.17 1127.12 28408 428.39 942.97 97.79∗∗∗ 0.01
MS GPA 18918 3.11 0.81 28408 2.49 0.83 0.62∗∗∗ 0.00
Table 1.5: Summary Statistics: High vs. Low ALA-Enrollment Schools
Students at ALA schools are less likely to be enrolled in Gifted and Talented
Education (GATE) programs; only 8% of students at ALA schools are enrolled in these
programs, relative to 21% at non-ALA schools. There is not a significant difference
in proportion of students enrolled in Special Education between High and Low ALA
Schools. However, this may be due to greater availability of special education resources
at low ALA schools, so does not rule out the possibility that ALA students are more
likely to be placed in special education programs.
Students at ALA schools perform significantly worse on all sections of the
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CELDT than students at non-ALA schools. This difference is particularly pronounced
on the speaking and writing sections. Finally, students at ALA schools have significantly
lower academic achievement. They score much worse than students at non-ALA schools
on the ELA section of the CST, as well as on the CST mathematics section, though
by less. Students at ALA schools also have significantly lower middle school GPA than
students at non-ALA schools.
Figure 1.6 shows the distribution of student scores on the English Language
Arts (ELA) portion of the California Standards Test (CST). The CST is administered
every two years to all students in California, and is the primary assessment by which
school and district funding is determined. ALA students perform significantly worse
than EO students on ELA CST.
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Figure 1.6: CST ELA Performance by ALA Enrollment
The out-performance of ALA students by EO stu dents is not limited to lan-
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guage skills. Figure 1.7 shows the distribution of student scores on the Mathematics
portion of the CST. ALA students perform worse than EO students on the math CST,
though by a smaller margin than on the ELA CST.
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Figure 1.7: CST ELA Performance by ALA Enrollment
Enrollment in ALA has long-term effects on academic achievement. Figure 1.8
shows the distribution of Middle School grade point average (GPA) for ALA and EO
students. Students enrolled in ALA during elementary school achieve significantly lower
grades in Middle School than students enrolled in EO.
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Figure 1.8: Distribution of Middle School GPA
Figures 1.9 and 1.10 show the correlation between CELDT score and ELA and
math CST scores. CELDT score is positively correlated with both CST math and ELA
scores, particularly at higher CELDT scores.
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Figure 1.9: CST ELA Score by CELDT Score
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Figure 1.10: CST Math Score by CELDT Score
Figure 1.11 shows the correlation between CELDT score and middle school
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GPA. There is a significant positive correlation between CELDT score middle school
GPA, particularly at high CELDT performance levels.
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Figure 1.11: Middle School GPA by CELDT Score
Lower standardized test scores and middle school grades for ALA students
has significant implications for long-term academic achievement and college-going. As
shown in Figures 1.12 and 1.13, middle school GPA is highly correlated with both the
verbal and math components of the Preliminary SAT, also known as the National Merit
Scholarship Qualifying Test (NMSQT). Students take the PSAT in preparation for the
SAT. A student’s score on the PSAT can be an indicator of how they will perform on
the SAT, and may therefore influence a student’s decision to take the SAT and apply
to colleges. ALA students have significantly lower middle school GPA, which decreases
their probability of achieving a high score on the PSAT.
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Figure 1.12: PSAT Verbal Score by CELDT Score
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Figure 1.13: PSAT Math Score by CELDT Score
38
1.4.2 Data Limitations
There are several potential difficulties with estimating the causal effect of ELL
programs using the NCSD data. First, the administrative data on enrollment in ALA
and EO programs does not directly correspond to course enrollment data in ELL pro-
grams, and does not provide year of enrollment. I reconcile this by using the direct
course enrollment data to determine whether an individual student was enrolled in an
ELL program in a particular year and grade level.
Second, the initial administration of the CELDT is given based on responses on
a parent survey to whether or not English is the students home language. Parents could
have an incentive to state that English is spoken in the home even if it is not in order to
ensure their childs initial classification into an EO classroom. Although teacher identi-
fication of a student as a non-native English speaker is also used in deciding whether or
not to administer the CELDT to a student, it is possible that some non native English
speakers are not taking the CELDT due to intervention by parents or misinformation
on the home language survey. This would bias results as this parental involvement and
motivation could be a confounding factor driving later academic success, and thus my
results would over-estimate the negative effect of the program on student achievement.
Third, the CELDT is scored at both the local and state level. Because the
local score is available immediately while it can take several months for the state score
to become available to the district and school, initial placement is based on the local
score. However, the official score of record is the state score, and we use the state scores
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in this paper. This could create bias if there are differences between the state and local
scores, particularly if the state scores are consistently higher or lower than the local
scores. However, the state and local scores are almost always equivalent. Nonetheless,
to overcome this bias, I use local scores.
Fourth, student take the CELDT when they first enroll in the district, and
each year until they are reclassified as English proficient. This generates both initial
and annual scores. Initial score determines initial eligibility for ALA, and probability
of assignment to an ALA or EO classroom. Annual years in consecutive years must
be above the English proficiency threshold in order for a student to be reclassified
as English proficient, but a score above the CELDT threshold level does not guarantee
reclassification as English proficient. Students must also score highly on the CEST ELA
and pass a writing performance based assessment. At the same time, students enrolled
in ALA for several years have different exposure to language development resources than
students initially enrolled in an EO classroom. To overcome this endogeneity, I consider
only local initial scores for kindergarten students taking the CELDT for the first time
upon their initial enrollment in the district.
Fifth, some schools do not offer ALA. Most schools that offer ALA have more
than half of their students enrolled in ALA programs. I use variation in ALA enrollment
between schools in order to isolate the effect of ALA on academic outcomes. However,
enrollment in an ALA or non-ALA school is not entirely exogenous. Parents of ELL
students at schools without ALA programs can sign a parental exemption waiver in
order to have their child transferred to a school that offers ALA. However, I am able
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to observe assigned school and enrolled school, and verify whether there are systematic
differences between transfer students and non-transfer students.
1.5 Model
I use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the causal
effect of enrollment in ELL programs on student achievement. RDD analysis relies
on discontinuity in the probability that a student is enrolled in a particular language
development program based on whether he or she scores above or below a threshold
score for English proficiency. The score threshold is used as an instrumental variable
for treatment in order to test whether students enrolled in ALA have different academic
outcomes than their observably identical peers enrolled in EO. The use of a regression
discontinuity design assumes that students enrolled in ALA and SEI would experience
the same trajectory in language abilities and academic achievement absence the treat-
ment. Under this assumption, assignment to ALA or EO is essentially random between
individuals who score just below the CELDT score threshold and those who score just
above the threshold. Future work modify this model to include a Multiple Rating Score
Regression Discontinuity (MRSRD). [65]
RDD studies are based upon the conditional expectation function (CEF) of
the outcome variable. [11] In this study, this is various measures of academic achieve-
ment, such as middle school GPA, CST math or language score, or PSAT score, given
the variable of interest, in this case CELDT score, represented as E[Yi|Si = S]. The
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causal effect of interest is fi(S), the effect of score on academic outcome, conditional
on enrollment in ALA or SEI. The difference in academic outcome between individuals
with Score S* with score S*-1 is given by:
E[Yi|Si = S]− E[Y i|Si = S − 1] = E[fi(S)fi(S − 1)|Si = S]
+E[fi(S − 1)|Si = S]E[fi(S − 1)|Si = S − 1]
(1.1)
The first term is the decomposition of the average causal effect of going from a
score of S-1 to S on the CELDT. However, the counterfactual average E[fi(S − 1)|Si =
S] is not observed. The second term is the difference between the average academic
outcome of those students with score S-1 and the academic outcome of those with score
S, or the omitted variable bias in this model. Selection on observables states that:
E[fi(S1)|Xi, Si = A] = E[fi(S1)|Xi, Si = S1] (1.2)
for all S, so that selection on observables eliminates omitted variable bias,
and conditional on a set of observable characteristics Xi, the CEF and average causal
response function are the same:
E[Yi|Xi, Si = S] = E[fi(S)] (1.3)
Then the causal effect of CELDT score is estimated conditional on X:
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E[Yi|Xi, Si = S]− E[Yi|Xi, Si = S − 1] = E[fi(S)fi(S − 1)|Xi]. (1.4)
In this paper, eligibility for enrollment in ALA changes abruptly at the thresh-
old score for English proficiency on the CELDT, which is varies with grade, subject area
and year. Because this rule is not followed precisely and depends upon the availability
of ALA programs at each school, this can be interpreted as a fuzzy RDD in which the
probability of treatment, i.e. enrollment in ALA, changes at the threshold CELDT
score due to exogenous scoring rules that determine a students English proficiency level
classification.
In conducting my econometric analysis, I follow the methodology of Card et
al. (2008). [20] The relationship of interest is the effect of enrollment in ALA on the
future academic outcome of individual i in score range s on CELDT subtest l, Yilst:
Yiklst = βXis + f(sl) + β
PPils + uilst (1.5)
where Xis is a vector of characteristics of individual in score range s, f(sl) is
a polynomial representing the subset l score profile of the outcome, Pils is an indicator
equal to 1 if individual i in CELDT score range s on subtest l is enrolled ALA, and 0
otherwise, and uilst is an error term. Then β
P is the difference in outcome between an
individual who is enrolled in ALA and one who is not.
The problem with estimating equation (1) is that program enrollment is en-
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dogenous to language development, cognitive ability, parental involvement, and other
observable and unobservable covariates. Because students are placed in ELL programs
based on their English proficiency, the probability of enrollment in a given ELL program
is discontinuous at the threshold CELDT score. As a result, the CELDT threshold for
classification as LEP provides an instrumental variable for program enrollment.
This gives the first stage equation:
Pils = αXils + g(sl) + α
BBilst + vilst (1.6)
where g(sl) is the subtest l CELDT score profile in enrollment in ALA, and
Bilst is an indicator equal to 1 if individual i in score range s scored below the threshold
level for English proficiency on subtest l of the CELDT in year t.
Combining (1) and (2) gives the reduced form equation:
Yilst = γXils + f(sl) + γ
BBilst + eilst (1.7)
where γ is a vector of coefficients, f(sl) is a score profile of outcome, and
γIV = γ
B/αC is the ratio of the reduced form coefficient of the threshold indicator Bilst
to the first stage coefficient.
Let Pils and Ylst represent population means of enrollment in ALA and aca-
demic outcome for individuals with CELDT subtest l score range s. Then (2) and (3)
can be fitted to individual ALA enrollment, CELDT score, and academic outcome data
using OLS and probit models, giving:
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Pls = psi1 + g(sl) + β
PBlst (1.8)
and
Yls = psi2 + f(sl) + γ
BBlst (1.9)
Because CELDT score is measured continuously, βP and γP can be estimated
by taking the average of P and y over score ranges on either side of the threshold.
1.6 Analysis
I limit my analysis to students who take the CELDT in elementary school
and, in particular, in kindergarten. Although I have data on students in preschool
through adult education, including elementary, middle and high school, I focus on ele-
mentary school students and on students who first enter NCSD and take the CELDT in
kindergarten. This is because initial classification as limited English proficient (LEP) is
dependent on initial CELDT score, while reclassification as English proficient depends
on a later administration of the CELDT on an annual basis until a student achieves
proficiency. CELDT scores can be either an annual score or the initial score upon the
first administration of the CELDT to the student. Although I show results for all score
types, I limit my analysis to initial scores for each studentin my preferred specification.
Once a student reaches middle or high school, the course options available to them based
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on their English proficiency change and vary by school and past exposure to language
development programs.
The CELDT is scored both locally when a student takes the exam and by the
state after test results are sent in for analysis. Because state scoring can take several
months and the student must be placed in a class upon enrollment in the district, local
scoring is generally used to initially place a student in a classroom. Although state and
local scores are almost always equivalent, it is the local score that should be directly
correlated with assignment to ALA or EO classroom For this reason, while I show results
for all score types, I limit my analysis to local scores. Scores can also be from a school or
district from which the student transferred. Because there is variation in these scores,
I ignore transfer scores and use local scores in my preferred specification.
Although the probability of enrollment in ALA is significantly negatively cor-
related with CELDT score, the first stage is not as clean as I would like. Table 1.6 shows
the results of a probit of ALA enrollment on CELDT total score and demographic con-
trols for whether a student is Hispanic, Spanish-speaking, and of low socio-economic
status (LSES). Results are given for all students, and for separately for students at
schools with over 50% of students enrolled in ALA. Regardless of proportion of stu-
dents at the school enrolled in ALA, CELDT score is significantly negatively correlated
with probability of enrollment in ALA. Hispanic ethnicity, Spanish native language, and
LSES are all significantly positively correlated with probability of enrollment in ALA.
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Table 1.6: Probability of ALA Enrollment
ALA Enrollment
All All High High
Total Score −0.0059∗∗∗ −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0058∗∗∗ −0.0059∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Hispanic - 0.8617∗∗∗ - 0.9482∗∗∗
- (0.1057) - (0.1370)
Spanish - 1.3927∗∗∗ - 1.4196∗∗∗
- (0.1063) - (0.1268)
LSES - 0.7862∗∗∗ - 0.4633∗∗∗
- (0.0586) - (0.0870)
n 10,778 10,778 5,566 5,566
Table 1.7: First Stage
Figure 1.14 provides a graphical depiction of the first stage results for all stu-
dents and grades in all years, using the local initial total CELDT score. There is a
significant negative correlation between CELDT score and probability of ALA enroll-
ment for most score levels. The lowest CELDT scores correspond to a probability of
ALA enrollment of approximately 0.80. This suggests that nearly a quarter of the lowest
performing students in terms of language ability are not enrolled in ALA. For students
scoring above the threshold level for English proficiency, nearly all students are enrolled
in EO.
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Figure 1.14: First Stage - All Students
Figure 1.15 provides that same first stage results for only kindergarten stu-
dents. The results are nearly identical. This is most likely because the vast majority
of students with an initial CELDT score, who are taking the CELDT for the first time,
are kindergarten students. Nonetheless, the figure provides evidence that there is not
significant variation across grade levels in probability of assignment to ALA based on
CELDT score.
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Figure 1.15: First Stage - Kindergarten Students
Figure 1.16 provides the same first stage results for kindergarten students in
a single academic year, 2008-2009. Restricting to the 2008-2009 academic year, the
negative correlation between CELDT score and ALA enrollment probability appears
more linear. There is some evidence of discontinuity in probability of ALA enrollment
at the threshold for English proficiency, though this discontinuity is small, less than
0.10. The 2008-2009 results further suggest that for some years and sub-groups, all
students scoring at the lowest CELDT levels are enrolled in ALA.
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Figure 1.16: First Stage - Kindergarten Students, AY2008-2009
Unfortunately, for most years and subgroups, schools do not appear to be
observing the rule for assignment to ALA classroom based on CELDT score. Some stu-
dents scoring above the CELDT threshold are enrolled in ALA, while even for students
scoring significantly below the threshold, less than half are enrolled in ALA.
This may be due to the fact that not all schools in the district have ALA
classes available. Therefore I restrict my analysis to schools in which ALA classes are
available. I choose several thresholds for proportion of students enrolled in ALA to
define high vs. low ALA schools, and my results are robust to these thresholds. My
preferred specification simply defines any school that offers ALA as a high ALA school
(the lowest proportion of students at any school that offers ALA is 0.20).
Figure 1.17 shows ALA enrollment by CELDT score for kindergarten students
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at schools offering ALA programs. Again, there is some evidence of discontinuity at
the threshold for English proficiency. However, even at these school in which ALA is
available, almost half of students scoring 100 points below the threshold are not enrolled
in ALA. This could be due to limited availability of ALA classrooms of certified bilingual
teachers, or due to parental decisions to place their children in EO classrooms. I am
not able to disentangle these from the data that I have.
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Figure 1.17: First Stage - ALA Schools
Figure 1.18 shows equivalent results for the academic year 2007-2008. Again,
there is some evidence of discontinuity at the threshold score that could potentially be
leveraged in an RDD.
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Figure 1.18: First Stage - ALA Schools, AY2007-2008
Figure 1.19 shows the first stage results using the listening subtest of the
CELDT for kindergarten students at schools with ALA programs for all academic years,
2004-2010.
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Figure 1.19: First Stage - CELDT Listening Subtest
Figure 1.20 shows the equivalent results for the speaking subtest. It does
not appear that either of these subtests is the limiting factor in students’ passing the
CELDT. There is some evidence for higher grades that the writing subtest score is bind-
ing in determining whether or not a student passes the CELDT. However, Kindergarten
and first grade students do not take the reading or writing subtests of the CELDT.
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Figure 1.20: First Stage - CELDT Speaking Subtest
Unfortunately, due to the lack of compliance with the assignment to ALA
rule based on CELDT score, my first stage results are not strong enough to achieve
meaningful second stage estimates. Nonetheless, I provide a preliminary second stage
analysis in the hopes that further data manipulation and understanding of program
implementation will strengthen my first stage results.
The following results are for the effect of ALA on Middle School GPA and CST
ELA and Math scores for students who took the CELDT in Kindergarten at schools
offering ALA, based on local initial CELDT score. These figures are produced using the
traditional RDD:
54
Yi = µ1(Scoreilst − S∗lt) + µ2(Scoreilst − S∗lt)2 + µ3Belowilst+
µ4(Scoreilst − S∗lt)Belowilst + µ5(Scoreilst − S∗lt)2Belowilst
(1.10)
where Yi is the outcome of interest for individual i, S
∗
lt is the threshold score
for English proficiency on section l of the CELDT in year t, and Belowilst is an indicator
equal to 1 if the individual scored below S∗lt on section l of the CELDT in year t. The
coefficient of interest is µ3, the second stage coefficient of the effect of scoring above the
CELDT threshold for English proficiency on academic outcomes Yi.
Table 1.8 gives the results based on CELDT total, listening, speaking, reading
and writing local initial scores for students taking the CELDT in Kindergarten at schools
offering ALA. There is a significant negative effect on CST ELA score of scoring below
the CELDT threshold for English proficiency. However, there is no evidence of an effect
on CST Math score or Middle School GPA.
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Table 1.8: CELDT RD - CST ELA & Math Scores and Middle School GPA
CST Verbal Score CST Math Score Middle School GPA
Total −9.67∗∗ 0.07 0.05
(106.71) (114.99) (0.04)
Listening −137.64 −54.34 -0.04
(89.77) (111.95) (0.20)
Speaking 63.95 −7.91 0.23
(140.59) (153.23) (0.20)
Reading 132.02 0.21 -0.06
(179.20) (160.29) (0.70)
Writing −163.21 102.06 −0.29∗∗
(190.62) (163.68) (0.15)
Obs. 6,516 6,516 3,151
Figure 1.21 provides a graphical representation of these results for CST ELA
score. There is some evidence of discontinuity in CST Verbal Score at the CELDT
threshold score. This would suggest that students enrolled in ALA due worse in terms
of English language skills and development than students of similar characteristics who
are enrolled in EO.
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Figure 1.21: CELDT RD - CST Verbal Score
Figure 1.22 provides a graphical representation of these results for CST Math
score. Although there is a positive correlation between CELDT score and CST math
score, there is no evidence of discontinuity at the threshold score for English proficiency.
57
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
C
S
T 
M
at
h 
S
co
re
-100 -50 0 50 100
CELDT Total Score
CST Math Score Fitted Values
Fitted values
CST Math Score on CELDT Total Score (2004-2010)
Figure 1.22: CELDT RD - CST Math Score
Figure 1.23 provides a graphical representation of these results for Middle
School GPA. There is no evidence correlation between CELDT score and Middle School
GPA, and no evidence of a sharp discontinuity at the CELDT proficiency threshold.
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Figure 1.23: CELDT RD - Middle School GPA
In order to observe whether there is an explanation for the lack of first stage, in
Table 1.9 I track several Hispanic, Spanish-speaking, low socioeconomic status students
who scored below the English proficiency threshold on the CELDT in kindergarten at
schools that offer ALA programs. Student 1 is observed in kindergarten/first grade in
the 2004-2005 academic year, and in Grades 2 and 3 in the following academic year, at
the same school. He persistently scores at Level 3, intermediate, on the CELDT. This
may be an example of placing students who fail the CELDT only marginally in main-
stream EO classrooms. Student 2 is observed in kindergarten in the 2004-2005 academic
year, then in kindergarten/first grade and Grade 2 in the following academic years. He
performs at the lowest level on the CELDT in kindergarten, then scores at level 4 and
level 5 in the following years. This may be evidence that teachers or parents make
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discretionary decisions regarding students’ placement in non-ALA classrooms, particu-
larly for younger, kindergarten students. Student 3 is observed in kindergarten through
Grade 4 in consecutive academic years, with widely varying CELDT scores. Student 4
is observed in non-ALA kindergarten in the 2004-2005 academic year, then in bilingual
ALA classrooms in Grades 1 and 2 in the following years, with low and intermediate
CELDT scores. Student 5 is observed in kindergarten through Grade 4 in consecutive
academic years at the same school, with steadily increasing CELDT scores. Student
6 appears to begin kindergarten in an EO classroom, and then transition to an ALA
kindergarten classroom in the following year. Student 7 goes through EO kindergarten
to Grade 2 in consecutive academic years at the same school, with steadily increasing
CELDT scores. Finally, Student 8 is observed in kindergarten in the 2005-2006 aca-
demic year at an intermediate CELDT level, then in a Grade 5 bilingual classroom;
this may provide evidence that students who just fail the CELDT are initially placed
in EO classrooms, and then transitioned to ALA classrooms if they perform poorly in
the mainstream EO classrooms.
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Table 1.9: Student Course Enrollment
Student Academic Year School Course CELDT Level ALA
1 2004-2005 339 GRADE K-1 3 0
1 2005-2006 339 GRADE 2 3 0
1 2006-2007 339 GRADE 3 3 0
2 2004-2005 317 KINDERGN AM 1 0
2 2005-2006 317 GRADE K-1 4 0
2 2007-2008 317 GRADE 2 5 0
3 2004-2005 317 KINDERGN AM 1 0
3 2005-2006 317 GRADE 1 5 0
3 2006-2007 317 GRADE 2 1 0
3 2007-2008 317 GRADE 3-4 3 0
4 2004-2005 313 KINDERGN AM 2 0
4 2005-2006 313 GRADE 1 BIL 3 1
4 2006-2007 313 GRADE 2 BIL 3 1
5 2004-2005 317 KINDERGN AM 2 0
5 2005-2006 317 GRADE K-1 4 0
5 2006-2007 317 GRADE 2 4 0
5 2007-2008 317 GRADE 3-4 5 0
6 2004-2005 354 KINDERGN AM 1 0
6 2005-2006 354 KINDR AM BIL 1 1
7 2005-2006 313 KINDERGN AM 2 0
7 2006-2007 313 GRADE 1 3 0
7 2007-2008 313 GRADE 2 5 0
8 2005-2006 355 KINDERGN AM 3 0
8 2009-2010 339 GRADE 5 BIL 3 1
Without a strong first stage, it is impossible to draw meaningful conclusions
concerning the effect of bilingual education programs such as ALA on student achieve-
ment. Schools do not appear to be following the assignment to treatment rule. Analysis
at the school level does not improve the first stage results.
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1.7 Conclusion
My paper uses a new, longitudinal student dataset from a large school district
in northern California. To my knowledge, my paper is the first to empirically consider
the long-term academic outcomes of students initially enrolled in English Only versus
bilingual programs at the district level in California. I find evidence that students
enrolled in bilingual programs do worse than their peers enrolled in mainstream English
only classrooms. My findings suggest that ELL programs may be detrimental to the
long-run academic success of non-English speakers and may perpetuate rather than
decrease the achievement gap between White and Hispanic students in California and the
U.S. However, the statistical significance of my results are undermined by the systematic
violation of the assignment to treatment rule across the district.
Because there are inertial effects determining a students path through the
public school system, initial placement upon entry into the school district, normally in
kindergarten, has significant and long-term effects on the classes a student is enrolled in
and the peers he or she interacts with. Initial classification as limited English proficient
(LEP) and enrollment in ALA has significant and long-term effects on academic out-
comes.Students initially enrolled in ALA have a high probability of remaining in ELL
programs throughout elementary school and into middle and high school, and achieve
lower grades and standardized test scores than their peers in EO programs. These
results have several significant policy implications.
Bilingual education programs are a highly contentious issue in California and
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across the United States, with significant long-term effects for student achievement, the
equitable distribution of education resources, and the development of human capital,
all of which contribute to long-term inequality in career and wealth outcomes between
native and non-native English speakers. Proponents of ALA argue that students enrolled
in ALA will be able to maintain their culture and roots in their native language, while
gradually being assimilated into the mainstream English speaking culture. However,
many students enrolled in ALA remain in the ALA track throughout elementary school,
and never transition into a mainstream English classroom. These students English
listening, speaking, reading, and writing skills may never achieve a level of proficiency.
As a result, upon reaching middle school, these students are put into ELD or SDAIE
classrooms with their friends and peers, and can stay in these non-mainstream English
classrooms throughout middle and high school. For example, Although California high
school students are required to pass the California High School Exit Exam (CAHSEE) in
order to receive a high school diploma, very few English learners pass the exam. In 2004,
only 48% of the Class of 2004, and only 19% of ELLs, had passed the exam. [35] This
has the potential to contribute to racial and linguistic segregation in school districts, as
well as long-term educational and socioeconomic inequality.
However, in both Calfornia and the United States, public education policy
must address the needs not only of ELLs, but also of English speakers. While integrating
ELLs into mainstream English classrooms may have positive benefits for ELLs, it may
be detrimental to English speakers. This raises significant and politically contentious
issues of social equity both for elementary school students in classrooms today, and for
63
society as a whole as these students develop the learning resources and human capital
that will propel them throughout their entire lives.
Public education policy pertaining to bilingual education and ELL students is
becoming increasingly important as the number of ELL students in the public school
system grows. With increasing number of immigrants in the U.S. school system, the
question of how children acquire English is at the forefront of national education policy.
Given its importance in classification of ELLs, the CELDT requires constant modifica-
tion and updating. Assembly Bill 124, which was signed into law in October of 2011,
requires that Californias State Superintendent of Public Instruction establish a commit-
tee of experts in English language to aid in the revision and updating of California ELD
standards, from which the CELDT is developed. These standards were submitted and
adopted in August and September of 2012, respectively. Alignment of the CELDT with
the new 2012 standards is contingent upon state funding, which was absent in 2012-
2013. However, the California Department of Education has taken action to proceed
with CELDT updating once funds become available.
However, revision of the CELDT alone is not enough to ensure success for
ELLs; the programs into which these students are placed as a result of CELDT clas-
sification must also be analyzed for the costs and benefits that they provide to stu-
dents.Evidence of the long-term effects of ELL programs such as ALA for both ELLs
and native English speakers has the potential to inform policy in developing educational
programs that benefit students of all levels of English proficiency.
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1.8 Future Research
Although the first stage in this RDD analysis of assignment to ALA based on
CELDT score is lacking, preventing my ability to draw meangingful conclusions about
the long-term effects of ALA on student achievement, I plan to pursue my research on
bilingual and other types of education programs. Future research will continue in the
area of education and English language development.
There are several potential extensions using the NCSD data set. The ALA
program only involves elementary school students. Middle and High School students
are who are classified as LEP are enrolled in ELD and SDAIE, respectively. Although
analysis of these programs is subject to endogeneity bias due to previous years in lan-
guage development programs, an analysis of the efficacy of these programs provides one
avenue for extension using this school data. Additionally, several papers have looked
into the effect of reclassification as English proficient on student outcomes. The timing
of reclassification may have a significant effect on student achievement. [63] However,
the sample size is significantly smaller and suffers from issues of endogeneity given that
students have already been tracked into separate classrooms and program upon their
arrival in the district and initial taking of the CELDT.
65
Chapter 2
Consumer Preferences for Safety in the
New Vehicle Purchasing Decision
2.1 Introduction
Each year in the U.S., 37,000 people die in automobile accidents, with an
additional 2.35 million injured or disabled. New vehicle fleet safety has increased over
time due in part to safety technology improvements and policy intervention; in 1978,
there were 50,133 motor vehicle fatalities in the U.S., despite lower vehicle miles traveled.
Vehicle safety technologies have played a large role in this reduction. [47]
Current regulations governing vehicle safety include seatbelt laws, speed lim-
its, and safety standards for crash prevention technologies, in addition to crashworthi-
ness ratings such as the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration
(NHTSA)’s New Car Assessment Program (NCAP). Improvements in vehicle safety
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technology are reflected in improvements in NCAP crash test performance over time.
According to the Department of Transportation’s Federal Register (2008), in 1979, the
first year that vehicles were rated for frontal impact safety under NCAP, under 30% of
vehicles received 4 or more stars (5 = most safe), whereas 98% of vehicle in model year
(MY) 2007 were rated at 4 or 5 stars. [6] Does regulation of motor vehicles in the form
of standardized safety ratings have a positive effect on safety?
Effective regulatory intervention of vehicle safety depends on how consumers
make individual purchasing decisions. Empirical evidence suggests that vehicle safety
is a primary concern for consumers. However, consumers face uncertainty in the ve-
hicle purchasing decision, with imperfect information about vehicle safety. Further,
consumers vary in their risk profiles and preferences for vehicle safety based on age,
gender, income level, education, children, etc. [41]
Vehicle safety rating programs provide comparative information on vehicle
safety to consumers. The two main vehicle safety rating programs in the US are NCAP
and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) ratings. The primary difference
between NCAP and IIHS ratings is that NCAP evaluates crashworthiness, while IIHS
evaluates both crashworthiness and crash avoidance. Both ratings are published in
Consumer Reports and advertisements.
As of September 2007, all new vehicles sold in the U.S. are required to display
NCAP safety ratings on the Monroney Sticker taped to the driver’s side window. NCAP
is a demand-side approach to improving safety. Using the discontinuity of the 5-star
NCAP ratings in underlying crash test performance score and the September 2007
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Monroney Sticker requirement as an event study, I evaluate consumer preference for
safety in purchasing new vehicles and the efficacy of the NCAP program in promoting
innovation in vehicle safety technology. I compare vehicles that just barely miss the
nearest star threshold (e.g. 4-star vehicles) to stars that just barely exceed the nearest
star threshold (e.g. 5-star vehicles). In theory, these vehicles should be identical in
underlying attributes and probability of injury. However, due to the NCAP rating
mechanism, some vehicles ‘exogenously’ receive an additional star in their safety rating.
I evaluate the effect of receiving this additional star (relative to just missing the nearest
star threshold) on vehicle sales.
If NCAP rating is a signal of true vehicle safety, and if consumers value vehicle
safety, then we can expect to observe preference for vehicles that receive a higher NCAP
star rating. However, previous literature suggests that producers may simply increase
vehicle curb weight as a way to improve crash test performance and star rating. Further,
producers may respond to an unfavorable NCAP rating by lowering price, investing in
crash-prevention technology, or other compensating behavior. I do not find a sales
response to receiving a higher NCAP rating. However, I do find evidence that vehicle
manufacturers are responding to the NCAP ratings program by (1) increasing curb
weight as a way to improve crash test performance and (2) raising price for vehicles
that score above the NCAP star threshold.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
literature and discusses my contribution. Section 3 discusses the U.S. National Highway
Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA)’s New Car Assessment Program
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(NCAP). Section 4 introduces the data and outlines my empirical strategy. Section 5
presents my results. Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 Previous Literature
This paper evaluates consumers’ willingness to pay product safety technol-
ogy in the automobile industry, a market with significant public health and economic
consequences. There is a large literature related to estimating willingness to pay by
individuals for risk reduction. [45], [79] In the context of worker safety, for example, or
consumer evaluation of risk of injury or death in the use of a particular product.
Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995) consider consumer price trade-offs for vehicle safety
and fuel efficiency. They evaluate the effect of vehicle durability on consumer choice
in order to evaluate an implicit rate of interest used by consumers in the new vehicle
purchasing decision. They find that buyers have a distribution of preferences over vehicle
attributes, but discount vehicle price for safety and fuel efficiency. [30]
Atkinson and Halverson (1990) estimate consumer willingness to pay for re-
ductions in probability of death. [12] They use a hedonic pricing model in which vehicle
performance characteristics such as safety technology directly enter the consumer utility
function, while price and fuel efficiency affect the consumer’s budget constraint. He-
donic models estimate vehicle price as a function of various vehicle attributes. The
implicit marginal price of each attribute is the partial derivative of price with respect to
that attribute. The authors model cost as a function of vehicle safety (predicted risk of
death based on vehicle characteristics) and performance characteristics for each vehicle
model. Real-world fatality rate is thus a function of a given model’s safety and driver
characteristics. Estimating this model for 112 vehicle models of MY 1978 vehicles, simi-
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larly to Dreyfus and Viscusi, the authors of also find that buyers are willing to discount
vehicle price for increased safety.
Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995) evaluate whether the increased cost of safety
features leads to a compensating price increase [15]. Their design endogenizes consumer
choice over vehicle characteristics in modeling price and demand elasticity. Using an
oligopolistic differentiated products model, the authors estimate cost as a function of
vehicle characteristics and demand as an aggregation of individual consumer behavior
in a discrete choice model. They find high demand elasticity for safety, and that the
cost of safety features is passed through to the consumer via price.
Knittel et al. (2011) consider vehicle weight, horsepower, torque and fuel
economy (CAFE) standards. They find only small gains in fleet fuel efficiency, largely
due to increases in vehicle curb weight. He argues that vehicle manufacturers respond
to the “arms race” over vehicle safety by increasing curb weight, at the expense of
fuel efficiency. This race to the heaviest generates negative externalities on the road,
particularly for occupants of lighter vehicle models. [48]
Do consumers respond to the mandatory disclosure of safety information via
increased demand for safer vehicles? Consumers value product quality but have im-
perfect ex ante information about vehicle quality prior to purchase. Aggregated and
standardized ratings decrease the cost of information acquisition and transfer. Learning
about product quality involves a costly investment of time and resources for buyers,
particularly for multi-attribute, technologically complex products such as automobiles.
Ratings and reviews decrease information acquisition costs for buyers. Increased infor-
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mation transparency over vehicle safety should, in theory, increase demand elasticity,
resulting in increased intensity of price competition and decreased profits for produc-
ers. [8]
Safety is a key factor in the new vehicle purchasing decision for consumers,
and previous studies have found a strong correlation between safety ratings and vehicle
sales. Positive safety ratings significantly increase likelihood of purchase. [81] Safety is
a primary factor in consumer choice over vehicle purchase. [49], [41], [80] Koppel et al.
(2007) survey participants in Spain and Sweden about the new vehicle purchase decision.
Respondents ranked safety over price, reliability, and other factors. The authors find
that this preference is stronger among EuroNCAP (the European version of NCAP)
users. [49]
Hellinga et al. (2007) evaluate the role of safety features in parents choice of
vehicles for teenagers. In a 2006 survey of 300 parents in Minnesota, North Carolina, and
Rhode Island, they find that parents rank safety, available family vehicle, and reliability
as the top reasons for choosing a vehicle for their teenager to drive. [41]
Using a sample of 2,002 Canadian drivers’ survey responses ranking importance
of features that buyers consider when buying a car and running ANOVA tests, Vrkljan
& Anaby (2011) find that safety and reliability are the highest ranked vehicle attributes
among respondents, while design and performance are the lowest lowest. They find that
younger drivers value safety less, with young male drivers rating safety lowest. [80]
Girasek & Taylor (2010) address the distributional and welfare effects of vehi-
cle safety using correlations and ANOVA to estimate the relationship between socioeco-
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nomic status and vehicle safety features. They link vehicle identification numbers and
information on vehicle safety features with data on buyers’ income and education. [38]
Empirical evidence shows a strong link between automobile safety and manu-
facturer reputation. The car market exhibits strong branding and advertising seen at
the model level. Using data on 23 million vehicles registered in the UK between 1992
and 2002, Bates et al. (2007) find that automobile safety recalls can damage brand
value and decrease stock price. [14] Choi & Lin (2008) evaluate consumer response to
Mattel product recalls. [25] Rupp et al. 2002 evaluate damage to shareholders from firm
vs. government initiated automotive recalls. [70]
However, ratings programs such as NCAP may have distortionary effects. Pro-
ducers face a tradeoff between product attributes, such as safety, fuel efficiency, and
performance. Vehicle manufacturers may improve crash test performance by increas-
ing vehicle weight, at the expense of fuel efficiency and performance. Ito and Sallee
(2014) evaluate corrective policy and ”attribute-based” regulation by constructing a
panel using a product identifier that is narrower than vehicle model. They find that
producers respond to curb weight-based fuel efficiency standards by adjusting vehicle
weight, exhibited in the data by bunching of vehicles at weight notches. This dis-
tortionary response by producers generates large welfare losses due to weight-related
externalities. [43]
If manufacturers design new vehicles to perform well on NCAP crash tests in a
simulated laboratory setting that differs significantly from real-world driving conditions,
this will crowd out innovation in safety technology that saves lives in real-world crashes.
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The automobile industry, particularly at the high end, exhibits technological innovation
via product differentiation, rather than decreasing costs. Product variety is correlated
with product durability/lifespan, and is higher than optimal unless an industry exhibits
high fixed product launch costs and low substitutability (which is not the case in the car
industry). [76] With high substitutability between differentiated products, the automo-
bile industry exhibits high product market competition. Existing models of endogenous
growth predict lower levels of innovation in more competitive markets. [29], [69], [39], [7]
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2.3 The New Car Assessment Program
NHTSA’s New Car Assessment Program provides comparative information on
the safety of new vehicles to assist consumers with vehicle purchasing decisions and
encourage motor vehicle manufacturers to make vehicle safety improvements. [Docket
No. NHTSA-2015-0119] Its mission is to: (1) Help consumers with vehicle purchasing
decisions, (2) Incentivize manufacturers to improve current safety performance and fea-
tures of new vehicles; and (3) Promote innovation and development of new vehicle safety
features. NCAP focuses on crashworthiness technology such as seatbelts and airbags,
but also identifies whether rated vehicles are equipped with Crash Avoidance Tech-
nologies, such as Electronic Stability Control (ESC), Lane Departure Warning (LDW),
and Forward Collision Warning (FCW). Additional crash avoidance technologies in-
clude rearview video systems (RVS), automatic emergency breaking, and tire pressure
monitoring systems (TPMS).
NCAP was established 1978 under Title II of the Motor Vehicle Information
and Cost Savings Act of 1972. In 1978, there were 50,133 motor vehicle fatalities in the
U.S. NCAP and other transportation policies have successfully decreased motor vehicle
deaths in the U.S.; in 2013, , there wer 32,719 motor vehicle fatalities in the U.S.,
despite increased vehicle miles traveled since 1978. NHTSA begain testing vehicles for
crashworthiness using frontal driver and frontal passenger crash tests with 1979 model
year. 5-Star ratings were introduced in 1994 for MY1990- vehicles. The side driver and
side passenger crash tests were added for MY1997, and rollover ratings for MY2001.
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Beginning in September of 2007, all new vehicles sold in the U.S. were required
to display the Monroney Sticker, which provides the NCAP 5-star safety ratings, as well
as fuel efficiency. Figure 2.1 shows the Monroney sticker for a 2010 Subarue Impreza.
The 5-star NCAP ratings are provided for Frontal and side driver and passenger and
rollover. Beginning with MY 2011-, the NCAP ratings formula was revised, with Overall
Vehicle Score introduced as a weighted average of the frontal, side, and rollover test
scores. Side pole testing was also introduced for MY 2011-. The Monroney sticker also
provides information on fuel efficiency.
Figure 2.1: Monroney Sticker for 2010 Subaru Impreza
In selecting which vehicles to rate for each model year, NHTSA rates a sample
of new vehicles that are predicted to have high sales volume, have been structurally
redesigned, or have improved safety equipment. NHTSA selects vehicles for testing on
the following basis: (1) provide NCAP ratings for all three programs (front, side, and
rollover); (2) maximize the percentage of fleet coverage by selecting vehicle models with
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high projected sales volumes; (3) focus on consumer or agency interests (e.g maximize
percentage of fleet coverage); (4) examine new safety features; and (5) consider vehicle
price. [6] Approximately 60% of the new light vehicle fleet for MY 2011 were tested by
NHTSA, for example. NHTSA purchases tested vehicles from dealerships across the
country; the vehicles are not supplied directly to NHTSA by the manufacturer. The
NCAP rating is binding; it is carried over until a model is re-tested. Re-testing is
done if an existing model is significantly structurally re-designed or if the manufacturer
introduces significant safety technology improvements in an existing vehicle model.
NHTSA purchases vehicles from dealerships and evaluates their crash perfor-
mance in controlled collisions, with risk of injury determined from sensors in crash test
dummies. For example, in the Frontal Crash Test: Crash test dummies representing
an average-sized adult male and a small-sized adult female are placed in the driver and
front passenger seats, respectively, and are secured with seat belts. Vehicles are crashed
into a fixed barrier at 35 miles per hour (mph), which is equivalent to a head-on col-
lision between two similar vehicles each moving at 35 mph. Instruments measure the
force of impact to each dummys head, neck, chest, pelvis, femur (legs), and feet. The
frontal crash rating is an evaluation of injury to the head, neck, chest, and femur (legs)
for the driver and right front seat passenger. Probability of injury is calculated via a
continuous underlying vehicle safety score (VSS). Thresholds are then superimposed on
the distribution of probability of injury to map VSS to a 5-star safety.
NCAP ratings are widely advertised by manufacturers. Cross-vehicle compar-
isons are regularly provided in mainstream press and consumer media (e.g. Consumer
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Reports). Consumer reports and other consumer-targeted product reviews also include
other ratings (e.g. IIHS, Edmunds), information on crash avoidance performance, fuel
efficiency, etc. Manufacturers regularly advertise vehicles’ test performance, and call
attention to poor performance by a rival.
Although manufacturers run their own crash tests in-house, at the margin
NCAP crash test performance is unknown by manufacturer. Further, test result is
binding until re-testing is triggered by a significant change in model production. Pro-
ducer choice over safety could be modeled as a repeated game, but I will argue that
vehicle manufacturers face uncertainty over vehicle crash test performance and star
rating.
NHTSA disseminates NCAP safety ratings via press release to over 1,000 or-
ganizations, including news services, consumer groups, magazines, etc., with readership
in the tens of millions, including Consumer Reports, The Car Book (published by the
Consumer Federation of America), and The Car Guide (published by the United States
Automotive Association (USAA). Ratings are also published online. [42]
NCAP has become a de facto safety mandate in that manufacturers re-design
poorly rated vehicles out of fear that consumers will deem them unsafe. In addition,
manufacturers increasingly reference vehicle model and fleet safety features, including
NCAP rating, in advertisements. [42]
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2.4 Data & Methodology
Using data from the Department of Transportation Federal Registrar’s Dock-
ets, I construct a novel dataset matching continuous crash test performance measures to
NCAP 5-star rating and monthly national sales at the model-level. I get information on
model-level vehicle characteristics and safety technology from DataOne, which provides
vehicle characteristics at the VIN-prefix level for the universe of light duty vehicles pro-
duced 1981-2016MY. I use monthly, model-level sales data from WARDS Automotive,
sales and production data for the U.S. and North America at the subseries level 1980-
2017. I use vehicle safety ratings from NHTSA’s New Car Assessment Program. This
includes crash test results and 5-star safety ratings for all rated vehicles from 1990-2016.-
Crash test results and 5-Star Safety Ratings for all rated vehicles 1990-2016.
To generate a crosswalk between NCAP rating and DataOne, I match on
lowercase make, model, body style, vehicle type, and drive train by calculating smallest
Levenshtein distance. I then calculate the best NCAP match for each DataOne vehicle.
For the majority of vehicles, once imposing a match on these characteristics there is
a single possible match. For vehicles with multiple possible matches I calculate the
standard deviation of NCAP ratings for each set of possible matches. In the majority
of cases this is 0. Finally, I visually inspect ambiguous cases to hard-code a match in
cases such as the BMW 128i/135i or the Lexus GS 350. In this way I am able to match
100% of the NCAP ratings to DataOne observations for MY1990-2010 vehicles.
Below are summary statistics and a balance test of covariates for all vehicles,
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all test types, all vehicle types, all years, based on whether a vehicle scored above (+1
Star) or below (-1 Star) the rating threshold on a given crash test. Each observation
represents one crash test. Vehicles that just make the nearest star rating threshold
are significantly more likely to have a higher MSRP and curb weight, and lower fuel
efficiency.
+1 Star -1 Star Diff
mean mean b p
MSRP 27461.46 24215.23 -3280.17∗∗∗ 0.00
Curb Weight 4223.99 3432.85 -799.75∗∗∗ 0.00
Height 67.34 60.63 -6.75∗∗∗ 0.00
MPG 18.90 20.21 1.28∗∗∗ 0.00
Max HP 193.51 166.60 -27.47∗∗∗ 0.00
Sales (volume) 1254.66 1849.26 597.95∗∗∗ 0.00
Sales (percent) 0.01 0.01 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00
Observations 195174 98582 293718
NCAP distinguishes four vehicle types: Cars, Trucks, SUVs and Vans. Pas-
senger Cars are further subdivided into mini, light, compact, medium and heavy based
on curb weight. There is further information on vehicle body style, drive train, and
production release. Ratings are provided at the vehicle make and model level. There
are 5 types of crash test ratings: Frontal Driver, Frontal Passenger, Side Driver, Side
Passenger, Rollover and Rollover 4WD. Table 2 provides summary statistics by vehicle
type for Cars and Trucks, which represent the majority of vehicle models and sales.
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Cars Trucks Diff
mean mean b p
MSRP 27461.46 24215.23 -2899.21∗∗∗ 0.00
Curb Weight 4223.99 3432.85 -1462.32∗∗∗ 0.00
Height 67.34 60.63 -15.04∗∗∗ 0.00
MPG 18.90 20.21 6.84∗∗∗ 0.00
Max HP 193.51 166.60 -7.66∗∗∗ 0.00
Sales (volume) 1254.66 1849.26 1626.52∗∗∗ 0.00
Sales (percent) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.11
Observations 195174 98582 231233
Using formulae from the DOT Federal Register [6], I am able to calculate the
continuous risk of injury used by the NCAP program to generate discrete 5-star safety
ratings from each crash test. I exploit discontinuity in the assignment of 5-star NCAP
ratings across clearly defined star thresholds in order to estimate demand- and supply-
side responses to just missing a star threshold. NCAP measures a continuous vehicle
crash probability of injury risk. Nature of the testing process prevents manipulation
along the running variable.
The Monroney Sticker reports discrete 5-Star Safety ratings for Frontal and
Side Driver and Passenger and Rollover based on underlying probability of injury cal-
culated from vehicle crash test performance. See Chapter 3 for the mapping formulae.
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Stars =

5, if Pr(Injury) ≤ T4,5
4, if T4,5 ≤ Pr(Injury) < T3,4
3, if T3,4 ≤ Pr(Injury) < T2,3
2, if T2,3 ≤ Pr(Injury) < T1,2
1, if Pr(Injury) ≥ T1,2
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) analysis relies on several critical as-
sumptions. First, assignment to treatment Di is determined by the value of a particular
covariate Xi being on either side of a threshold value c. The unconfoundedness assump-
tion is thus given by: Yi(0), Y i(1)Di|Xi. This can be problematic because there are no
values of Xi that overlap, requiring extrapolation in estimating the average treatment
effect. Second, the monotonicity assumption requires that Di(Xi) be non-increasing in
Xi at Xi = c. Finally, RDD analysis assumes continuity of the covariate distribution
functions at the point of discontinuity (threshold).
Given the extensive amount of in-house testing conducted by vehicle manufac-
turers, one might expect car makers to make improvements to vehicles that seem likely
to score below the 5-star probability-of-injury threshold. However, probability of injury
is continuous across the ratings threshold, whereas gaming would be clear via bunching
of test scores above the star threshold.
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Figure 2.2: Density Test of Running Variable
NCAP provides a sharp RD design. Assignment to treatment Di = 1[Xi ≥ c].
Then Pr(Di = 1) = 1 if Xi ≥ c and Pr(Di = 1) = 0 if Xi < c.
The outcome of interest Yi is evaluated via a binary treatment variable Di
indicating whether or not a vehicle scored at or above the nearest rating threshold T
. Thus Di = 1Pist(Injury) > T and let Yi(1) denote the outcome with treatment (i.e.
vehicles that scored above the nearest star threshold) and Yi(0) denote the outcome
without treatment (i.e. vehices that scored below the nearest star threshold.) Because
each vehicle model receives only one star safety rating in each model year, the true
effect of safety information disclosure Yi(1) − Yi(0) is unobservable at the individual
vehicle model level. Then the average treatment effect is T = E[Yi(1)−Yi(0)|Xi = c] =
E(Yi(1)|Xi = c]− E(Yi(0)|Xi = c].
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Figure 2.3 shows the first stage, pooled for all test types and years. My running
variable, continuous probability of injury, perfectly predicts star rating assignment,
allowing for a sharp RD design.
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Figure 2.3: First Stage
To determine consumer demand for safety, I evaluate the correlation between
Safety Rating and Sales:
Sales = β0 + β1f(P (Inj)) + β2(+1Star) + β3f(P (Inj))(+1Star) + ε (2.1)
Pr(Injury) is calculated for each vehicle for frontal driver, frontal passenger,
side driver, side passenger, and rollover. I use ratings and crash test data for MY1990-
2010.
A fundamental limitation of RDD is that can only be used to the estimate effect
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of treatment at point of discontinuity. This suggests a tradeoff between restricting the
sample to be near the threshold, and including more data further from the threshold
point. Further, the consistency and unbiasedness of RDD estimates depend on the
absence of strategic behavior (gaming) at the threshold point.
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2.5 Analysis & Results
I measure consumer response to vehicle safety information disclosure as the
percentage increase in vehicle sales at the model level. If consumers are responding to
safety, we would expect to observe an increase in sales of vehicles scoring just above a
star threshold relative to vehicles scoring just below a star threshold. I am interested
in whether sales become more sensitive to safety as a result of the NCAP rating system
Monroney Sticker.
The majority of models score between 3 and 5 stars. I therefore focus my
analysis on the sales effect of scoring 5 (relative to 4) and 4 (relative to 3), i.e. estimating
the treatment effect at the 5-4 and 4-3 star ratings thresholds. I report pooled results.
Because NCAP rates vehicles based on vehicle type, which is categorized based
on vehicle curb weight, I investigate heterogeneity in sales response across vehicle class.
I expect less of an effect of the NCAP in less competitive vehicle categories where
consumers have limited choice over vehicle type.
If consumers value safety, then the 2007 Monroney Sticker requirement should,
all else being equal, lead to an increase in sales of higher-rated vehicles. Figure 2.4 plots
total series-level market share (in terms of monthly U.S. new vehicle sales) by star rating
(1990-2015).
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Figure 2.4: Sales
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Figures 2.5, 3.5.1, and 2.7 show average series-level MSRP, curb weight, and
fuel efficiency by star rating (1990-2015). The red vertical line delineates the September
2007 Monroney Sticker mandate.
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Figure 2.5: MSRP Continuity Check
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Figure 2.6: Curb Weight Continuity Check
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Figure 2.7: MPG Continuity Check
My outcome of interest is vehicle sales. The continuity assumption requires
that covarites be continuous across the underlying running variable threshold in order to
accurately calculate estiamtes via regression discontinuity. However, any sales response
may be biased by changes in other vehicle characteristics. First, therefore, I examine
whether NCAP affects MSRP, curb weight, fuel efficiency, and horsepower.
Producers may simply offset a negative star rating by dropping price, damp-
ening any observed sales effect. Figure 2.8 plots mean MSRP by normalized probability
of injury (the underlying, continuous running measurement from the NCAP crash test
that is then mapped to a 0 5-star safety rating). I predict a negative correlation be-
tween probability of injury and MSRP. This is reflected in the data. I find evidence of
discontinuity in MSRP at the ratings threshold.
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Figure 2.8: MSRP
Figure 2.9 plots mean curb weight against NCAP probability of injury. All else
equal, I predict a negative correlation between curb weight and probability of injury.
Producers may simply improve vehicle safety by increasing vehicle weight; if manufac-
turers also invest in fuel-saving technology to keep fuel efficiency high despite weight
vehicle weight increases. [48] I find some evidence of discontinuity in curb weight at the
ratings threshold. I am unable to conclude that manufactuers are not responding to
NCAP by simply increasing curb weight.
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Figure 2.9: Curb Weight
Figure 2.5 plots mean fuel efficiency (miles per gallon, city and highway driving
combined) against NCAP probability of injury.
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Figure 3.5.1 plots mean maximum horsepower against NCAP probability of
injury.
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
M
ax
. H
P
-.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Normalized Pr(Injury)
Max. HP pre-2007 Max. HP post-2007
+1 Star pre-2007 -1 Star pre-2007
+1 Star post-2007 -1 Star post-2007
Mean maximum horsepower by crash test score (pooled), 1990-2010MY.
Figure 2.10: Horsepower
Figure 2.1 provides my main results. I am unable to conclude that a favorable
NCAP rating has a significant positive effect on model sales.
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Figure 2.11: Results: Sales RD
Table 2.1 provides my key results for sales response by NCAP crash test type.
I do not find a consistent, significant effect on sales of the scoring an additional star
on the six NCAP crash test types. This may be due to manufacturers passing safety
improvements through to the consumer via price, downwardly biasing any estimates of
the effect of NCAP safety rating on sales.
Table 2.2 show the RD estimates in NCAP Pr(Injury) and star rating for
curb weight, maximum horsepower, fuel efficiency, and MSRP. Only curb weight varies
significantly with Pr(Injury); there is a strong quadratic relationship. This finding
suggests that vehicle manufacturers are responding to the NCAP ratings by increasing
curb weight.
Finally, figure 2.3 provides the RD estimates for sales, MSRP and curb weight
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FD FP SD SP Roll Roll 4WD
Pr(Injury) 0.953 -0.695 0.145 0.613 -0.472 -0.886
(0.649) (0.464) (0.252) (0.684) (0.495) (5.540)
Pr(Injury) sq -1.828 2.193** -0.570 -2.384 0.970 -11.64
(1.957) (1.065) (0.922) (2.581) (1.074) (90.07)
+1 Star -0.0195 0.0975 0.0254 0.0197 -0.00109 -0.0773
(0.0158) (0.0788) (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0391) (0.105)
+1 Star * Pr(Injury) -1.372 6.145 -2.524 -1.417 -0.802 -2.650
(1.060) (4.355) (2.907) (1.564) (2.471) (5.038)
+1 Star * Pr(Injury) sq -1.358 50.88 -66.65 -9.672 -35.36 -13.85
(16.21) (56.08) (73.78) (28.92) (42.25) (152.4)
Constant 0.0513*** 0.0589*** 0.0253*** 0.0138*** 0.0402*** 0.0895
(0.0141) (0.0214) (0.00640) (0.00470) (0.0121) (0.0759)
Observations 32,604 37,346 15,764 13,271 13,841 9,477
R-squared 0.090 0.134 0.053 0.048 0.019 0.065
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.1: Sales RD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Curb Weight Max HP MPG MSRP
Pr(Injury) -12,835** -510.5 -17.16 -43,660
(5,074) (427.6) (18.60) (45,060)
Pr(Injury) sq 29,959** 993.7 19.60 74,154
(12,039) (1,141) (44.20) (123,138)
+1 Star 70.05 -9.715 -1.477* -158.3
(160.7) (16.65) (0.881) (2,085)
+1 Star * Pr(Injury) 6,089 606.7 24.64 -58,305
(17,415) (1,485) (69.56) (156,194)
+1 Star * Pr(Injury) sq -122,901 6,085 328.2 -1.328e+06
(293,686) (26,561) (1,304) (3.020e+06)
Constant 3,452*** 187.8*** 21.31*** 24,174***
(144.0) (11.30) (0.804) (1,292)
Observations 122,272 122,303 110,754 122,272
R-squared 0.073 0.010 0.018 0.021
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.2: RD - Vehicle Attributes
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for both pre- and post- September 2007. Interestingly, both curb weight and MSRP
show a large, significant negative response to NCAP Pr(Injury) in the post period.
This provides evidence that consumers are responding to the Monroney sticker 2007
mandate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Curb Weight Curb Weight (post) MSRP (post) MSRP Sales (post) Sales (post)
Pr(Injury) -5,876 -21,575*** -1,542 -96,027** 0.585 0.286
(5,858) (6,538) (57,988) (37,012) (0.499) (0.427)
Pr(Injury) sq 10,657 52,871*** -22,420 200,893* -1.241 0.0126
(13,150) (16,147) (157,835) (103,360) (1.349) (1.225)
+1 Star -136.7 334.8 -2,106 2,559 0.0462 0.00588
(178.6) (226.5) (2,472) (2,450) (0.0393) (0.0115)
+1 Star * Pr(Injury) -33,614** 59,184** -343,288* 309,921 0.293 -0.520
(16,713) (28,610) (202,288) (192,803) (2.068) (0.864)
+1 Star * Pr(Injury) sq -632,994** 583,534 -5.050e+06 3.424e+06 -0.230 -10.58
(289,110) (452,703) (3.921e+06) (3.254e+06) (37.40) (10.60)
Constant 3,267*** 3,719*** 23,453*** 25,002*** 0.0479*** 0.0193***
(134.7) (256.0) (1,624) (1,430) (0.0124) (0.00611)
Observations 52,746 69,526 52,746 69,526 52,766 69,537
R-squared 0.073 0.129 0.026 0.051 0.022 0.056
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.3: RD + Event Study
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates whether consumers respond to information about vehicle
safety in making vehicle purchasing decisions. I evaluate this using (1) an event study
around the 2007 Monroney Sticker mandate and (2) using an RDD around the NCAP
star thresholds. I consider the sales response, any changes in price that might be
dampening this estimated response, and technology adoption by manufacturers. I find
no sales response at the NCAP ratings threshold. Rather, I find discontinuity in curb
weight and MSRP at the star threshold, suggesting that manufacturers are increasing
vehicle curb weight in order to perform better on crash tests and are passing the cost
of “safety” improvements through to consumers via increased price.
In theory, greater transparency over product information leads to higher prod-
uct quality. If this is true, and if NCAP does in fact increase transparency over vehicle
safety, it would suggest a role for regulatory intervention in correcting product market
information asymmetries as a channel by which to promote technological innovation.
However, the relationship between product quality, innovation and competition is am-
biguous.
Can public policy incentivize the adoption of life-saving vehicle safety technol-
ogy, and if so, what is the most cost-effective way to achieve this? My findings suggest
a role for regulatory intervention in standard-setting, and also in correcting for infor-
mation asymmetries as a channel to promoting technological innovation.This paper also
highlights the importance of designing policy interventions that target technological
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development to take into consideration where along the technology adoption life-cycle
a certain technology, product or market might be. For example, what is the optimal
testing regime and rating system for the NCAP program? For example, a longer testing
timeframe would increase manufacturers’ incentive to score above the star threshold,
which may strengthen supply-side response. Further, if NCAP generates a negative ex-
ternality born disproportionately by drivers of older, less-safe vehicles, does this suggest
a government role in subsidizing vehicle safety for less-safe vehicles?
It may be more effective, for example, to set and enforce crashworthiness stan-
dards than to subsidize emergency response costs. Is it more cost effective to invest in
programs to promote private-sector innovation in safety technology, or invest in infras-
tructure, law enforcement, etc.? If the answer is dependent on stage of technological
innovation and adoption of various crash prevention and crashworthiness technologies,
then there is potential for policy reform to more accurately promote vehicle safety.
There are significant equity/distributional consequences to regulation of safety
technology in U.S. passenger vehicles. It is the role of government to intervene in product
markets in order to ensure public safety. Fortunately, economics provides a number
of channels for this intervention, from programs and standards designed to decrease
information asymmetry, to policies that incentivize innovation in health and safety.
Federal safety regulation has played an active role in the U.S. automobile market since its
inception, from speed limits, to seatbelt laws, to airbag and other federal motor vehicle
safety standards. Further, production constraints can lead to a tradeoff between vehicle
safety and fuel efficiency. As a result, fuel economy standards can also have an indirect
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effect on vehicle safety. Programs such as NCAP that establish a federal mandate
and avenue for the disclosure of vehicle safety information can alleviate information
asymmetry, but may have adverse effects, such as causing producers to increase curb
weight as a low-cost way to increase vehicle crashworthiness (citation). In this case,
there is a negative externality to a ”vehicle arms race” to improve crashworthiness as
the return to safety is positively correlated with the number of heavier vehicles (e.g.
SUVs) on the roads.
Is there a role for government intervention to promote vehicle safety, or is
information sharing in the status quo sufficienct to promote an optimal level of innova-
tion in the auto market? Is it more effective to target the consumer or producer side
of the market in designing policy to promote safer automobiles? Safety information
can provide a positive externality, suggesting a role for programs such as NCAP that
standardize/facilitate/subsidize accurate information sharing with consumers. Further,
given the extended production timeframe in the automobile market, there are distribu-
tional and welfare effects as firm response (in terms of safety technology adoption) is
seen in the discontinuing or introduction of models, and trickles down to the used car
fleet and onto public roads. Given the U.S’s position as a leader in the auto industry,
federal vehicle safety regulations such as NCAP have implications beyond U.S. markets,
seatbelts, helmets in other countries.
One possible outcome of NCAP is that producers may increase curb weight
when they receive and unfavorable rating in order to improve crashworthiness, the safety
outcome that NCAP measures. This could potentially lead to a vehicle weight ”arms
98
race” with negative externalities in terms of safety (for other vehicles) and automobile
emissions [43] Therefore any attribute-based policy must consider general equilibrium
effects throughout the industry, not just in terms of vehicle safety.
The U.S. is a market leader in automobile industry standards, and the NCAP
program has significant implications beyond the U.S. for international standardiza-
tion of vehicle safety evaluation regimes. Versions of NCAP exist as Euro NCAP,
China NCAP, Japan NCAP, Korean NCAP, Australasian NCAP, Latin America and
Caribbean NCAP.
I am also interested in whether the NCAP safety ratings affect manufacturers’
adoption of life-saving technologies. Does NCAP affect the diffusion of safety technolo-
gies throughout the fleet of new vehicles (e.g. from high-end to low-end vehicles)? Do
firms shift to crash prevention technology, which may be more cost-effective than con-
tinued investment in crashworthiness technology, given different S-curves of technology
adoption? Manufacturer response likely depends on appropriability and imitation costs
of safety and other vehicle technology.
Perhaps a good place to start is by asking whether NCAP accurately signals
information about vehicle safety. In Chapter 3, I use data from NHTSA’s Fatal Accident
Reporting System (FARS) and the Texas Department of Transportation’s Crash Records
Information System (CRIS) to evaluate the correlation between NCAP ratings and real-
world crash outcomes. FARS is a national reporting system for all vehicle collisions in
the U.S. involving a fatality, while CRIS has fatal and non-fatal vehicle collision data
for Texas. [45]
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Chapter 3
Test Driving the New Car Assessment
Program
3.1 Introduction
Automobile accidents are the leading cause of death via unintentional injury
in the U.S. [22] In 2016, there were 37,461 motor vehicle fatalities in the U.S., or
1.18 per 100 million vehicle miles traveled (VMT). This represented a 5.6% increase
from 2015 relative to a 2.2% increase in VMT. In 2015, there were 35,092 fatalities
in 2015 (1.12 per 100 million VMT), and 2,443,000 injuries in automobile accidents.
The US Center for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that the 33,687 fatalities due
to motor vehicle accidents in 2010 incurred a medical cost of over $374 million. For
non-fatal hospitalized injuries in 2010 for motor vehicle occupants, of which there were
178,505, the CDC estimates an average medical cost of $54,197. For nonfatal Emergency
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Department treated and released injuries for motor vehicle occupants in 2010, of which
there were 2,557,616, the CDC calculates an average medical cost of $3,222. [22]
Given the increasing importance of transportation to public health, the trans-
portation industry is an important yet often overlooked consideration in today’s eco-
nomic and political climate, particularly in its implications for public health and so-
cioeconomic equality. Federal safety regulation has played an active role in the U.S.
automobile market since its inception, from speed limits, to seatbelt laws, to airbag and
other federal motor vehicle safety standards. As highlighted in Chapter 2, government
intervention in the market for vehicle safety can help correct for information asymme-
tries between producers and consumers. There are thus significant public health and
economic consequences to automobile safety standards and regulation. Safety ratings
can provide a demand-side approach to improving safety. Safety is primary factor in
consumer choice over vehicle purchase [49], [41], [80], and safety information can pro-
vide a positive externality for public health and spending. Aggregated and standardized
ratings decrease the cost of information acquisition and transfer.
Vehicle safety technology has significant and widescale implications for pub-
lic health and regulatory policy. U.S. regulators can influence vehicle safety via two
mechanisms: (1) safety standards (such as seatbelts, airbags or safety ratings); and (2)
recalls or bans of dangerous vehicles. In keeping with (1) and as discussed in Chapter
2, the U.S. National Highway and Transportation Administration (NHTSA) evaluates
the safety of all new vehicles sold in the United States. NHTSA publishes these safety
ratings for new vehicle models sold in the U.S. on a 5-Star scale for frontal and side
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driver and passenger, and rollover, crash tests via the New Car Assessment Program
(NCAP). The 5-Star NCAP vehicle safety ratings are published on the NHTSA website,
in numerous consumer reports, and are required to be displayed in the driver’s window
of all new vehicles sold in the U.S.
In this paper, I match NCAP safety ratings with real-world crash data from the
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) and Texas’ Crash Records Information Sys-
tem (CRIS) in order to determine whether there is a correlation between NCAP rating
and vehicle-level crash outcomes, and whether NCAP rating is an accurate predictor of
risk of injury and/or death for vehicle occupants. The FARS database represents all car
crashes in the U.S. involving at least one fatality, while the Texas CRIS data represents
all police-reported car crashes in Texas.
A significant limitation to this approach is that if the NCAP program changes
consumer behavior, as addressed in Chapter 2, this will bias any estimates of the true
relationship between NCAP Pr(Injury) and real-world crash outcomes. For example, if
safer drivers are willing to pay a premium for safer vehicles, and if these consumers are
more likely to be influenced by the NCAP program, then any finding of a relationship
between NCAP rating and real-world crash outcomes may over-state the true correlation
between predicted risk of injury and real-world injury, fatality and vehicle damage due
to driver selection.s Similarly, if more dangerous drivers tend to purchase certain vehicle
models and drive them more recklessly, these models may be falsely deemed less “safe”
due to driver selection. Although future work will aim to incorporate vehicle registration
data, in this paper I am unable to control for driver behavior due to data limitations.
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Further, if FARS and CIRS crash reports do not include less severe crashes with no
fatalities (FARS) or no injuries/less than $1000 in property damage (CIRS), then data
under-represents less severe crash outcomes, which in turn are more likely to involve
safer vehicles.
Nevertheless, a strong comparison of NCAP crash test results to real-world
crash outcomes seems warranted. After all, how valuable are NCAP ratings to con-
sumers if they are based on highly restrictive and simulated crash conditions which
bare little resemblance to real-world accidents? [60] I find minimal correlation between
NCAP Pr(Injury) and occupant injury and vehicle damage outcomes. I find a strong
negative correlation between curb weight and injury and damage rates. Further, curb
weight is significantly negatively correlated with Pr(Injury), as well as fuel efficiency.
Drawing on my results from Chatper 2, I am left to conclude that manufacturers respond
to NCAP by increasing vehicle weight as a way to improve model crash test scores.
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
literature and discusses my contribution. Section 3 discusses NCAP and FARS. Section
4 introduces the data and outlines my empirical strategy. Section 5 presents my results.
Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Previous Literature
I examine whether the New Car Assessment Program’s safety ratings accu-
rately predict real-world crash outcomes in terms of vehicular damage and occupant
injury and fatality rates. As discussed in Chapter 2, NCAP’s 5-star vehicle safety rat-
ings are highly salient so consumers. They are federally mandated to be displayed
alongside mileage on the Monroney window sticker of each new car sold in the U.S., and
are widely published in consumer reports and advertisements. Consumers use NCAP
ratings in making the new vehicle purchasing decision, and producers design new vehi-
cles to perform well on NCAP crash tests. However, these crash tests are conducted in
a highly simulated laboratory setting hat may not reflect real-world conditions.
Crash testing is conducted under highly simulated laboratory conditions. Fur-
ther, data on crash outcomes from police reports lack detailed information on occupant
injury, and may over-classify injuries as “serious” that under the Abbreviated Injury
Scale (AIS) would generally be considered “minor”. [60] Crash reports do not report
body region of injury; however, crash test ratings are calculated based on measurements
taken from crash dummies, which indicate risk of injury to specific regions of the body.
Unsurprisingly, previous studies have found discrepancies between crash ratings and
real-world crash outcomes.
An innovative safety technology is often implemented at first by a single man-
ufacturer or as a standard feature for luxury models. Only with enough data to provide
evidence that the technology is actually effective in reducing injuries or deaths does
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NHTSA enter the extended process of mandating a given technology’s includsion in all
future model-year vehicles. This process invovles federally mandated rule-making proce-
dures and a staggered implementation and enforcement period that is coordinated with
the automobile industry’s cyclical design timeframe. The time for new safety technology
to “trickle down” to penetrate the used vehicle fleet is even longer. [38] According to
NHTSA, it takes a median of 12.5 years for cars to age out of circulation in the United
States [?].
Previous studies have shown a lower risk of injury and death for higher-rated
vehicles. (Campbell 1982, Jones & Whitfield 1988, Lie & Tingvall 2002, Kullgren et al.
2010, Ryb et al. 2010, Metzger et al. 2015, Farmer 2006) [19] Jones & Whitfield (1988)
compare NCAP risk of injury to driver to 6,405 crashes in Texas, controlling for vehicle
mass, driver age, restraint use and accident severity. [45] NCAP rating was calculated
based on Head Injury Criterion (HIC), Chest Deceleration (CD) and femur load to
crash dummies. However, the authors restrict their analysis to estimating the risk of
incapacitating injury or death for drivers in single-car, fixed-object, rontal collisions. A
companion paper finds similar results using a sample of fatal frontal collisions between
two vehicles of similar mass.
Lie & Tingvall (2002) evaluate the accuracy of the Euro NCAP in predicting
injury and death outcomes. They consider severe and fatal injury outcomes to driver
and front-seat passenger in two-car crashes (they find no correlation between rating
and minor injury outcomes). Using a sample of 64 Euro NCAP-rated vehi cle models.
They find that occupants of vehicles rated 3 or 4 stars (at the time of the study Euro
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NCAP has a maximum of 4 stars) are significantly less likely to experience severe or
fatal injuries than vehicles rated 2 stars. However, 1200 of approx. 1500 cases in their
sample involve vehicle that had not been rated. Further, the authors do not estimate
results separately by vehicle class (curb weight). [54]
Metzger et al. (2015) evaluate the correlation between NCAP rating and real-
world risk of injury to rear seat occupants. Using a sample of 18,218 vehicles NASS-
CDS (a nationally representative sample of approximately 5,000 police-reported vehicle
crashes annually involving at least one towed vehicle and causing property damage
and/or injuries. NASS over-samples certain types of crashes, including crashes involving
fatalities and/or hospitalizations. They restrict their sample to 5- vs. 4-star vehicles
and to restrained vehicle occupants. They find a slightly lower probability of injury for
rear-seat occupants of vehicles that received a 5-star rating from the frontal driver and
passenger impact tests (relative to 4-star). They find no correlation between side driver
and passenger NCAP rating (the only crash test that incorporated measurements from
a rear-seat crash dummy) and risk of injury to a rear-seat passenger. They conclude
that updating the NCAP rating system to better reflect rear seat risk of injury should
be prioritized. [57]
Ryb et al. (2010) compare Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) crash
test ratings to mortality rates in real-world crashes. They look at injury to drivers in
frontal crashes using a detailed sample from the Crash Injury Research Engineering
Network (CIREN). IIHS rates vehicles as “good”, acceptable, marginal and poor. They
find that vehicles rated good or average experienced lower mortality rates. However,
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over half of their sample of 1,276 drivers were driving non-rated vehicles.
Matching vehicle safety ratings from the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety,
FARS, and vehicle registration data, Farmer (2006) find significantly lower fatality rates
for “poor” vs. “good” rated vehicles. [34]
Kullgren et al. (2010) use discrete 5-star Euro NCAP score (not continuous
probability of injury) to compare relative risk of injury calculated from crash reports
and insurance claim data. They find a lower risk of injury and mortality for higher Euro
NCAP-rated vehicles. [51]
Newstead et al. (2003) consider both NCAP and IIHS frontal crash test ratings
and real-world accident outcomes in Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania. They do not find
a significant correlation between crash test performance and real-world injuries. The
authors argue that this disparity is due to the lack of detailed information on occupant
injury in real-world police-reported crashes. [60] However, this disparity results in part
from the highly simulated conditions of the crash testing relative to real-world driving
behavior.
Injury severity depends on a number of factors besides vehicle crashworthiness.
Vehicle speed and configuration at the time of the crash, vehicle size and weight, and
restraint use by vehicle occupants may have a greater effect on injury probability and
severity than just crashworthiness. [60]
Lack of correlation between NCAP predicted probability of injury and real-
world crash outcomes could suggest the need for reform of the NCAP program. Krafft
et al. (2000) propose an alternative method to deriving risk functions based on change
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in vehicle velocity during crash. [50]
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3.3 The New Car Assessment Program
NHTSA’s New Car Assessment Program provides comparative information
on the safety of new vehicles to assist consumers with vehicle purchasing decisions
and encourage motor vehicle manufacturers to make vehicle safety improvements. Its
mission is to: (1) Help consumers with vehicle purchasing decisions, (2) Incentivize
manufacturers to improve current safety performance and features of new vehicles; and
(3) Promote innovation and development of new vehicle safety features. [6]
NCAP was established 1978 under Title II of the Motor Vehicle Information
and Cost Savings Act of 1972. NHTSA begain testing vehicles for crashworthiness using
frontal driver and frontal passenger crash tests with 1979 model year. 5-Star ratings
were introduced in 1994 for MY1990- vehicles.
A variety of ratings systems exist, both in the US and internationally. There
are both private and government-regulated ratings, for new and used vehicles, from both
experts and consumers. NCAP is a government-run program, but industry ratings are
also published. Edmunds provides both new and used car ratings, including peer/owner
ratings out of 5 stars by 0.5-star increments. While NCAP is a predictive rating system,
there are also retrospective ratings based on crash reports and insurance claims. For
example, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (DOI) has an Early Warning Report-
ing (EWR) to monitor fleet performance post-sales. NCAP focuses on crashworthiness,
but other ratings programs evaluate crash avoidance and prevention technologies.
The primary rating program other than NCAP in the US is the Insurance
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Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), which began publishing a frontal offset impact
rating in 1995. In addition to evaluating crash worthiness like NCAP, IIHS also rates
vehicles for crash avoidance and mitigation. In terms of crashworthiness, IIHS rates
vehicles Good, Acceptable, Marginal or Poor based on performance on six crash tests:
driver-side small overlap front, passenger-side small overlap front, moderate overlap
front, side, roof strength and head restraints. In terms of crash avoidance, IIHS rates
all vehicles with available front crash prevention systems either Basic, Advanced or
Superior, based on the system type and vehicle performance in crash tests. IIHS also
tests and rates headlights as Good, Acceptable, Marginal or Poor.
Due to the complexity of vehicle safety technology and other vehicle char-
acteristics, transaction and search costs for individual consumers in the new vehicle
purchasing decision can be high. Ratings program such as IIHS can be complex. A pri-
mary goal of the 5-star NCAP ratings was to simplify and standardize the information
about vehicle safety that consumers are exposed to when purchasing a new vehicle.
NCAP focuses on crashworthiness technology such as seatbelts and airbags,
but also identifies whether rated vehicles are equipped with Crash Avoidance Tech-
nologies, such as Electronic Stability Control (ESC), Lane Departure Warning (LDW),
and Forward Collision Warning (FCW). Additional crash avoidance technologies in-
clude rearview video systems (RVS), automatic emergency breaking, and tire pressure
monitoring systems (TPMS).
NCAP calculates safety ratings for each vehicle based on three separate crash
tests: frontal, side and rollover. The frontal driver and passenger crash test involves
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crashing the tested vehicle into a fixed crash barrier and is conducted at 35mph (56.3
km/h). The driver and front-seat passengers are average-sized adult male dummies
and rating is an evaluation of injury to the head and chest (discussed further below).
Only vehicles from the same weight class can be compared. The frontal test simulates
a head-on collision between two similar vehicles each traveling at the same speed.
The side driver and side passenger crash tests were added for MY1997. In the
Side Impact crash test, all vehicles are hit with the same force by a moving barrier or
pole, so rating results can be compared across all classes. The crash test is conducted at
38.5mph and is intended to simulate an intersection-type crash. The driver is an average-
sized adult male dummy and the passenger is an average-sized adult male dummy in
the rear seat, and rating is calculated based on measurements on injury to the chest.
This is the only crash rating that measures injury to a rear-seat occupant.
NCAP introduced rollover ratings for MY2001- vehicles. The Rollover crash
test assesses risk of rollover and is calculated based measurements taken from driver and
front-seat passenger dummies. Rollover ratings can be compared across vehicle classes.
As of September 2007, NCAP 5-star ratings are required to be displayed in
the driver’s side window of all new vehicles sold in the US. In 2011, NHTSA overhauled
the NCAP ratings formulae and introduced a new “Overall” star rating for MY2010-
vehicles as a weighted average of the front, side and rollover ratings. In this paper,
I restrict my analysis to MY 1994-2010 vehicles and therefore do not use the overall
rating category.
For each of the three crash test types, measurements taken from driver and
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front passenger dummies are used to generate six types of crash test rating types: Frontal
Driver, Frontal Passenger, Side Driver, Side Passenger, Rollover and Rollover 4WD. In
2011, and Overall rating was added as a weighted sum.
Risk of injury on each Test is calculated for Front and Rear Driver and Pas-
senger(s). Instruments measure the force of impact to each crash dummys head, neck,
chest, pelvis, femur (legs), and feet:
P (Injury) = f(HIC, TTI, CD,PD,FL)
where HIC is Head Injury Criterion, TTI is Thoracic Trauma Index, CD is Chest De-
celeration, PD is Pelvis Deceleration, and FL is Femur Load.
The Probabilities of Injury on each Test type T = Front, Side, Rollover are
calculated as the average of the Driver and Passenger crash performance scores:
PT (Injury) = 0.5PT,Driver(Injury) + 0.5PT,Passenger(Injury)
For the Frontal Crash Test:
PDriver(Injury) = (1− (1− PHead(Injury)) ∗ (1− PChest(Injury)))
where PHead(Injury) and PChest(Injury) are calculated for both Driver and
112
Passenger according to the formulae:
PHead(Injury) = 1/(1 + 1/(1 + exp(5.02− 0.00351HICFront)))
PChest(Injury) = 1/(1 + 1/(1 + exp(5.55− 0.0693CDFront)))
Post-2010, Overall vehicle performance is calculated from the front, side and
rollover crash tests according to the formula:
POverall(Injury) = 0.42PFront(Inj.) + 0.33PSide(Inj.) + 0.25PRoll(Inj.)
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3.4 Data & Methodology
I construct a novel dataset using underlying probability of injury, the continu-
ous running variable used to calculate the NCAP 5-star ratings from vehicle crash test
performance. I match NCAP probability of injury with two databases of police crash
reports: (1) NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS); and (2) Texas De-
partment of Transportation’s Crash Records Information System (CRIS).
I get data on crash outcomes from the National Highway Transportation and
Safety Administration (NHTSA)’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). FARS
provies detailed police crash reports on all motor vehicle accidents occuring on public
roads in the U.S. involving at least one fatality, 1975-2018. FARS accident variables
include manner of collision, type of intersection, light condition, atmospheric conditions,
speed limit, roadway condition, and other accident-level variables. FARS vehicle-level
variables include vehicle travel speed at the time of the crash, areas and extent of
damage, etc. Manner of collision in the FARS dataset is dependent on the directions
of travel of the vehicles involved and the geometry of the points of impact, and is
divided into Rear-end, Head-on, Rear-to-Rear, Angle, Sideswipe and same vs. opposite-
direction.
They key vehicle-level outcome variables I use in my analysis are vehicle dam-
age and number of deaths. Vehicle damage in the FARS data is coded as none, minor,
functional or disabling.
I calculate vehicle damage outcomes as total counts over total number of
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crashes by model within a 2-year window of vehicle model year:
Yi,MY =
MY+2∑
t=MY
(y/Crashes)it,MY
where Yi,MY is my outcome of interest, vehicle damage and death rates by
model i and model year MY ; Crashesit,MY is the total number of crashes by vehicle
model and crash year t, inclusive; and yit,MY is total number of deaths and counts of
vehicle damage for model i and model year MY in crash year t.
FARS Person-level variables on driver and passengers include age, gender,
height, weight, seating position, restraint use, and injury severity. There is also detailed
information on driver history, including previous motor vehicle citations. Crash tests are
done with belted crash dummies. I present results for both restrained and unrestrained
vehicle occupants.
The key person-level outcome variable I use in my analysis is injury severity,
which is coded categorically as no injury, possible injury, incapacitating injury, non-
incapacitating injury, or fatal injury. As with vehicle damage, I calculate occupant
injury outcomes as total counts per occupant over total number of crashes by model
within a 2-year window of vehicle model year:
Yi,MY =
MY+2∑
t=MY
(y/(Crashes ∗Occupants))it,MY
where Yi,MY is my outcome of interest, occupant injury rates by model i and
model year MY ; and yit,MY is total injury count for model i and model year MY in crash
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year t. I calculate Yi,MY for no injury, possible injury, minor injury, non-incapacitating
injury, incapacitating injury, and fatal injury counts.
The FARS data is not representative of all crashes. It under-represents less
severe crashes, as it only includes crashes in which at least one person was killed. To
overcome this reporting bias, I use data from Texas’ Department of Transportation’s
Crash Records Information System, a database of all motor vehicle collisions, not just
accidents resulting in fatalitiies.
Texas’ DOT CRIS contains all data collected from the Texas Peace Officer’s
Crash Report (CR-3). Texas Transportation Code 550.062 requires any law enforcement
officer who in the regular course of duty investigates a motor vehicle crash that results
in injury to or death of a person or damage to property to the apparent extent of $1000
or more to submit a written report of that crash to the TxDOT within 10 days of the
crash. Form CR-2 is the equivalent form required of the driver of a motor vehicle in
a meeting the above conditions not investigated by a law enforcement officer. The TX
CRIS data thus under-represents minor crashes that involve no deaths or injuries and
under $1000 in property damage. The key CRIS outcome variables I use in my analysis
are injury rates and vehicle damage. Injury categories are unknown, no injury, possible,
nonincapacitating, incapacitating, and death. Vehicle damage is coded on a scale of 1
= minimal damage to 7 = maximum damage.
As in Chapter 2, I get information on model-level vehicle characteristics and
safety technology from DataOne, which provides vehicle characteristics at the VIN-
prefix level for the universe of light duty vehicles produced 1981-2016MY. These include
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information on vehicle body style, drive train, and production release. I get model-level
sales data from WARDS Automotive, which provides sales and production data for the
U.S. and North America at the subseries level for MY1980-2017. I use vehicle safety
ratings from NHTSA’s New Car Assessment Program. Ratings are provided at the
vehicle make and model level.This includes crash test results and 5-star safety ratings
for all rated vehicles from 1990-2016.- Crash test results and 5-Star Safety Ratings for all
rated vehicles 1990-2016. Combining NCAP rating and underlying probability of injury
with detailed information on driver, occupant and crash characteristics allows me to
control for any systematic differences in restraint use, driver characteristics, crash type,
or other covariates across models that could potentially bias any estimates.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the FARS data. I observe a total
of over 400 unique vehicle models across MY1994-2010. The mean NCAP star rating
is 3.98, with a mean Pr(Injury) of 0.15 based on all test types. The mean number of
crashes per model within a 2-year window of MY is 182. Over 60% of vehicle occupants
are the driver, 20% front passenger and 20% rear passenger.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for the TX CRIS data. Because I only
have CRIS outcomes for 2010 onwards, my results for the TX data are for MY2008-
vehicles. Because the CRIS data includes minor accidents in addition to fatal accidents,
it is not surprising that the mean NCAP star rating for the TX data is 4.46 with a mean
Pr(Injury) of 0.10. The mean number of crashes per model, 1555, is an order of mag-
nitude greater than for the FARS data. The mean fatality rate, .004, is approximately
half that of the FARS data.
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Table 3.1: FARS Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Model Year 2000.371 4.181 212766
Crash Year 2001.401 4.21 212766
Curb Weight 3591.403 1217.557 212523
Height 63.204 10.085 212523
MPG (city) 17.087 3.937 197865
MPG (highway) 23.698 5.36 197865
Max HP 147.753 93.41 212766
MSRP 22213.88 7707.572 212364
NCAP Star Rating 3.978 0.946 212763
NCAP Pr(Injury) 0.15 0.1 212766
Total Crashes 181.721 213.479 212766
Driver 0.609 0.488 212766
Passenger (Front) 0.198 0.399 212766
Passenger (Rear) 0.141 0.348 212766
No Injury 0.003 0.012 206208
Possible Injury 0.001 0.007 206208
Non-Incapacitating Injury 0.002 0.009 206208
Incapacitating Injury 0.001 0.007 206208
Fatal Injury 0.004 0.015 206208
Minor Damage 0.075 0.263 212766
Functional Damage 0.143 0.35 212766
Disabling Damage 0.707 0.455 212766
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Table 3.2: TX Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Model Year 2009.246 0.796 244328
Crash Year 2010.693 0.762 244328
Total Crashes 1555.143 1745.271 244328
Curb Weight 3885.828 1048.838 244327
Height 64.302 7.886 244327
MPG (city) 19.674 5.17 230592
MPG (highway) 26.964 5.787 230592
Max HP 220.852 75.209 244328
MSRP 26209.246 9073.752 244326
NCAP Star Rating 4.46 0.651 244328
NCAP Pr(Injury) 0.099 0.064 244328
Total Crashes 1555.143 1745.271 244328
Total Injuries 0.236 0.155 244328
Deaths 0.002 0.003 244328
Incapacitating 0.014 0.041 244328
Non-Incapacitating 0.059 0.033 244328
Possible 0.163 0.149 244328
No Injury 1.142 0.212 244328
Unknown 0.02 0.014 244328
Vehicle Damage (max=7) 2.246 2.299 239053
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3.5 Analysis & Results
3.5.1 FARS
The FARS crash outcomes I consider are accident, fatality and injury rates
(relative to both total US sales and total accidents by vehicle model), as well as vehicle
damage (minor, functional, or disabling), as a function of NCAP Pr(Injury).
Figure 3.1 plots the distribution of NCAP Pr(Injury) for the FARS data. For
the following FARS results, I restrict my analysis to Pr(Injury) ≤ 0.40.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of NCAP Pr(Injury): FARS
It is important to note that NCAP Pr(Injury) is positively correlated with
curb weight, as shown in figure 3.5.1. This is unsurprising, as heavier vehicles perform
better on crash tests.
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Figure 3.2: Curb Weight vs. NCAP Pr(Injury)
NCAP Pr(Injury) is negatively correlated with maximum horsepower, as shown
in figure 3.5.1. This is opposite to what we would expect, as safety and performance
are substitutes in manufacturer choice over vehicle attributes.
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Figure 3.3: Max HP vs. NCAP Pr(Injury)
Figure 3.5.1 shows total crash count against NCAP Pr(Injury). Because NCAP
measures crashworthiness, not crash avoidance, it is unsurprising to find no correlation
between crash rate and NCAP Pr(Injury). However, this figure does not control for
sales volume, which will skew crash counts towards more popular vehicle models.
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Figure 3.4: FARS Crash Count
As shown in Chapter 2, consumers may respond to NCAP safety ratings in
purchasing, which is reflected in sales. If so, I would expect a jump in number of crashes
at the ratings threshold of Pr(Injury). Figure 3.5 plots total sales against normalized,
pooled NCAP Pr(Injury) for all test types and star levels by model. I find no evidence
of discontinuity at the NCAP ratings threshold.
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Figure 3.5: FARS Crashes: RD
Figure 3.6 plots FARS fatality rate against NCAP probability of injury, for all
models, vehicle occupants and test types. There is a strong positive relationship be-
tween real-world fatality rate and NCAP predicted probability of injury. The quadratic
relationship between fatality rate and Pr(Injury) appears to hold for low values of
Pr(Injury).
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Figure 3.6: FARS Fatalities
Figure 3.7 provides the same results for disabling damage to vehicle. Disabling
damage is increasing in Pr(Injury), as we would expect, as “disabling” is the most severe
damage category.
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Figure 3.7: FARS Vehicle Damage: Disabling
Figure 3.8 provides the same results for functional damage to vehicle. The re-
lationship with Pr(Injury) is ambiguous, which may reflect categorical coding of vehicle
damage severity.
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Figure 3.8: FARS Vehicle Damage: Functional
Figure 3.9 plots rate of minor vehicle damage against Pr(Injury). There is
a negative correlation, as we would expect, as “minor” is the least severe category of
vehicle damage, excluding no damage.
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Figure 3.9: FARS Vehicle Damage: Minor
Because vehicle damage is coded categorically in the FARS data, no dam-
age rate (the inverse of “any” damage) may reveal a stronger correlation with NCAP
Pr(Injury). Figure 3.10 plots the rate of no vehicle damage against Pr(Injury). The
relationship is ambiguous.
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Figure 3.10: FARS Vehicle Damage: None
Figure 3.11 plots no injury rate against NCAP Pr(Injury). The relationship is
negative, as we would expect.
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Figure 3.11: FARS No Injury
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Figure 3.12 provides the same figure for possible injury. The relationship is
weakly negative.
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Figure 3.12: FARS Possible Injury
Figure 3.13 provides the results for non-incapacitating injury rate. The rela-
tionship is ambiguous.
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Figure 3.13: FARS Non-Incapacitating Injury
Figure 3.14 provides the results for incapacitating injury. I would expect a
strong positive correlation with NCAP Pr(Injury); however, the relationship is ambigu-
ous.
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Figure 3.14: FARS Incapacitating Injury
Finally, figure 3.15 plots fatal injury rate against NCAP Pr(Injury). As pre-
dicted, there is a strong positive relationship.
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Figure 3.15: FARS Fatal Injury
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Table 3.3 provides estimates for fatal injury outcomes. Reported estimates
are based on MY1994-2010 vehicles for all star ratings and test types. I cluster at the
vehicle model level and weight by total crash counts. Injury outcomes are weighted
by number of vehicle occupants. My estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of the
quadratic, so my proceeding results will present linear regression estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Fatal Injury Fatal Injury Fatal Injury Fatal Injury
NCAP Pr(Injury) 0.00196** 0.00317* 0.000505 -0.00116
(0.000828) (0.00171) (0.00202) (0.00173)
Pr(Injury) sq -0.00238 5.73e-05 0.00238
(0.00218) (0.00255) (0.00253)
Ln(Curb Weight(lbs.)) -0.00153*** -0.00128**
(0.000232) (0.000595)
Ln(Max HP) 0.000113
(0.000279)
Ln(MPG)(city) -0.00173**
(0.000719)
Ln(MPG)(highway) 0.00252***
(0.000889)
Ln(Speed) 3.54e-05 3.66e-05
(4.13e-05) (5.50e-05)
Driver accident within past 3 years 2.15e-05 3.52e-05
(2.35e-05) (2.75e-05)
Driver DWI in past 3 years -3.73e-05** -6.11e-05*
(1.49e-05) (3.45e-05)
Driver speeding in past 3 years -9.75e-05 -0.000187**
(7.55e-05) (9.29e-05)
Constant 0.000489** 0.000386 0.0134*** 0.00801
(0.000233) (0.000281) (0.00215) (0.00540)
Observations 206,208 206,208 187,815 139,908
R-squared 0.041 0.043 0.220 0.195
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.3: FARS Fatal Injury
Table 3.4 provides results for occupant injury outcomes. Reported estimates
are for all test types and seat positions. The variation in injury rates appears to be
driven by fuel efficiency. This is likely due to the strong negative correlation between
fuel effieciency and curb weight. This relationship holds for all NCAP test types.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES No Injury Possible Non-Incapacitating Incapacitating Fatal
NCAP Pr(Injury) -0.000372 -0.000116 -0.000178 -0.000130 -8.08e-06
(0.000394) (0.000139) (0.000220) (0.000213) (0.000574)
Ln(Curb Weight(lbs.)) -6.98e-05 -0.000104 -0.000102 -0.000169 -0.00129**
(0.000450) (0.000163) (0.000254) (0.000241) (0.000604)
Ln(Max HP) -0.000141 -3.78e-05 -0.000114 -0.000106 9.19e-05
(0.000179) (6.61e-05) (9.58e-05) (9.61e-05) (0.000283)
Ln(MPG)(city) -0.000882** -0.000336** -0.000638*** -0.000695*** -0.00176**
(0.000398) (0.000149) (0.000200) (0.000204) (0.000707)
Ln(MPG)(highway) 0.00151*** 0.000517*** 0.000922*** 0.000931*** 0.00250***
(0.000515) (0.000194) (0.000295) (0.000286) (0.000876)
Ln(Speed) 8.56e-05 3.36e-05 5.22e-05 5.28e-05 4.26e-05
(6.18e-05) (2.34e-05) (3.60e-05) (3.61e-05) (6.02e-05)
Driver accident within past 3 years 5.47e-05 1.96e-05 3.13e-05 3.27e-05* 3.93e-05
(3.39e-05) (1.28e-05) (1.94e-05) (1.98e-05) (3.10e-05)
Driver DWI in past 3 years -3.31e-05 -1.37e-05 -1.95e-05 -1.44e-05 -6.07e-05*
(2.33e-05) (8.48e-06) (1.25e-05) (1.09e-05) (3.41e-05)
Driver speeding in past 3 years -0.000190* -7.21e-05* -0.000111* -0.000107* -0.000195*
(9.91e-05) (3.74e-05) (5.77e-05) (5.64e-05) (0.000101)
Constant -0.000632 0.000471 0.000486 0.00110 0.00821
(0.00401) (0.00142) (0.00225) (0.00209) (0.00552)
Observations 139,908 139,908 139,908 139,908 139,908
R-squared 0.107 0.066 0.098 0.119 0.194
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: FARS Injury Outcomes
Table 3.5 breaks out the linear regression results for fatal injury rates by test
type. Columns (1)-(6) provide estimates for Frontal Driver, Frontal Passenger, Side
Driver, Side Passenger, Rollover and Rollover 4WD test results, respectively. The frontal
and side driver regressions restricts to occupants in the driver position, while the front
and side passenger regressions restricts to occupants in the front passenger position.
The rollover and rollover 4WD regressions include all occupants.
Table 3.6 provides fatal injury results by vehicle type. The coefficient on
Pr(Injury) is insignificant for all vehicle types. The negative relationship between fa-
tality rate and curb weight holds and is significant for Trucks and SUVs, the heavier
vehicle types.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FD FP SD SP Roll Roll 4WD
NCAP Pr(Injury) 0.00114 0.000931* -0.00270** -6.89e-05 0.00286 0.0118***
(0.000959) (0.000520) (0.00121) (0.00125) (0.00393) (0.00307)
Ln(Curb Weight(lbs.)) -0.00214*** -0.000684 -0.00494*** -0.00146 -0.00288** -0.00236**
(0.000568) (0.000428) (0.00155) (0.00104) (0.00130) (0.00106)
Ln(Max HP) 0.000383 2.69e-05 0.000985 0.000387 0.000838* 0.000524**
(0.000406) (0.000254) (0.000859) (0.000527) (0.000449) (0.000258)
Ln(MPG)(city) -0.00292*** -0.000248 -0.00338 -0.00266 6.63e-05 0.00192
(0.000954) (0.000793) (0.00250) (0.00178) (0.00140) (0.00130)
Ln(MPG)(highway) 0.00291*** 0.000951 0.00253 0.00154 0.00182 -0.00142
(0.00108) (0.000676) (0.00260) (0.00155) (0.00112) (0.000925)
Ln(Speed) -4.41e-05* -4.44e-05* 6.82e-06 1.78e-05 -3.05e-05 2.99e-05***
(2.26e-05) (2.46e-05) (3.16e-05) (3.36e-05) (3.63e-05) (8.35e-06)
Driver accident 2.45e-05 -4.62e-05* -3.08e-05 8.42e-06 2.45e-05 6.45e-05**
within past 3 years (3.88e-05) (2.39e-05) (6.64e-05) (4.77e-05) (2.36e-05) (3.01e-05)
Driver DWI -0.000138 0.000150** 0.000266* 8.71e-05 -5.15e-05*** -2.48e-05
within past 3 years (0.000105) (6.27e-05) (0.000135) (0.000136) (1.86e-05) (2.31e-05)
Driver speeding -1.19e-05 1.86e-05 5.56e-05 -2.11e-05 -1.95e-05 -2.13e-06
within past 3 years (3.68e-05) (2.56e-05) (5.30e-05) (5.32e-05) (3.11e-05) (1.92e-05)
Constant 0.0160*** 0.00400 0.0388** 0.0134 0.0144 0.0142*
(0.00470) (0.00312) (0.0153) (0.0108) (0.00932) (0.00769)
Observations 4,642 1,355 14,949 3,046 6,560 2,579
R-squared 0.228 0.219 0.122 0.023 0.260 0.089
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5: FARS Fatalities by NCAP Crash Test Type
Table 3.7 shows my regression results for the FARS data for vehicle damage
outcomes. Vehicle damage rates are calculated based on total crash count by model.
There does not appear to be a strong relationship with NCAP Pr(Injury). Restricting
results to frontal collisions and by vehicle type does not alter my findings.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Cars Trucks SUVs Vans
NCAP Pr(Injury) -0.00143 0.000657 0.000259 -0.000884
(0.00101) (0.000980) (0.00223) (0.00324)
Ln(Curb Weight(lbs.)) 0.00387 -0.00339** -0.00438** -0.00437
(0.00254) (0.00121) (0.00207) (0.00721)
Ln(Max HP) 0.00142 0.000801 0.00432*** -0.000861
(0.00112) (0.000511) (0.00124) (0.00195)
Ln(MPG)(city) 0.00746** 0.000809 0.0116*** -0.0199
(0.00362) (0.00105) (0.00400) (0.0124)
Ln(MPG)(highway) -0.00442 -0.00108 -0.00408 0.00898
(0.00304) (0.00131) (0.00361) (0.00808)
Ln(Speed) -2.22e-05 -3.30e-05* -0.000404** -2.96e-05
(8.06e-05) (1.89e-05) (0.000162) (9.84e-05)
Driver accident within past 3 years 3.37e-05 -3.28e-05 0.000192* 0.000113
(6.53e-05) (3.08e-05) (9.62e-05) (0.000234)
Driver DWI in past 3 years 2.25e-05 -4.07e-05 -2.92e-05 0.000191
(0.000140) (4.90e-05) (0.000299) (0.000803)
Driver speeding in past 3 years -0.000248 -1.88e-05 -1.62e-05 0.000393
(0.000161) (1.43e-05) (0.000123) (0.000365)
Constant -0.0430* 0.0259** -0.00120 0.0715
(0.0230) (0.0101) (0.0217) (0.0657)
Observations 80,296 29,828 21,913 7,871
R-squared 0.016 0.102 0.035 0.006
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: FARS Outcomes by Vehicle Type
3.5.2 TX CRIS
Figure 3.16 plots the distribution of NCAP Pr(Injury) for the Texas CRIS
data. I restrict my results for the CRIS data to Pr(Injury) ≤ 0.25.
136
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Crashes Deaths Minor Functional Disabling No Damage
NCAP Pr(Injury) 65.55 0.0343 0.326 -0.294 -0.130 0.0260
(67.52) (0.0654) (0.243) (0.285) (0.354) (0.0260)
Ln(Curb Weight(lbs.)) 12.79 -0.602*** 0.112 -0.607* 0.636* 0.00320
(73.62) (0.109) (0.106) (0.326) (0.358) (0.0117)
Ln(Max HP) -81.07* 0.119** 0.00300 0.375** -0.375** -0.00195
(46.63) (0.0478) (0.0551) (0.153) (0.166) (0.00773)
Ln(MPG)(city) -154.6* -0.271 0.434** 0.527* -0.682** -0.0648
(92.07) (0.165) (0.177) (0.276) (0.335) (0.0467)
Ln(MPG)(highway) 180.5* 0.270** -0.387** -0.778** 0.944** 0.0646
(92.61) (0.120) (0.183) (0.338) (0.422) (0.0469)
Ln(Speed) 6.061*** -0.00471 0.0147** -0.0367 0.0157 -0.000162
(2.301) (0.0105) (0.00668) (0.0297) (0.0238) (0.000789)
Driver accident -1.265 -0.0126** -0.0105 -0.00799 0.0193 -0.00162
within past 3 years (3.222) (0.00577) (0.0112) (0.0170) (0.0190) (0.00104)
Driver DWI 13.86* -0.00104 0.0392** -0.0215 -0.0266 -0.00249
within past 3 years (7.811) (0.00687) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0251) (0.00162)
Driver speeding 7.766*** 0.0196 0.000744 0.0386 -0.0367 -0.00261*
within past 3 years (2.433) (0.0170) (0.00775) (0.0503) (0.0393) (0.00153)
Constant 246.4 4.837*** -0.981 4.343 -3.633 -0.0333
(577.6) (0.997) (1.078) (2.974) (3.271) (0.141)
Observations 67,277 142,133 142,133 142,133 142,133 142,133
R-squared 0.142 0.543 0.031 0.041 0.028 0.005
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.7: FARS Vehicle Damage
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Figure 3.16: NCAP Pr(Injury) Distribution: TX
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Figure 3.17 shows CRIS fatality rate by NCAP Pr(Injury). Rates are total
counts over total crashes by model. There is a positive correlation between NCAP
Pr(Injury) and fatality rate, as we would expect.
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Figure 3.17: TX Fatalities
Figure 3.18 shows the same figure for incapacitating injury rate.The relation-
ship is positive, as expected.
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Figure 3.18: TX Injuries: Incapacitating
Figure 3.19 shows the same results for non-incapacitating injury. The positive
relationship between NCAP Pr(Injury) and crash vehicle occupant injury rate holds.
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Figure 3.19: TX Injuries: Non-Incapacitating
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Figure 3.20 shows the results for “possible” injury. There is a negative corre-
lation with NCAP Pr(Injury). This is likely due to categorical coding occupant injury
severity.
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Figure 3.20: TX Injuries: Possible
In order to overcome categorical coding of occupant injury severity, I consider
mean total number of occupant injuries per vehicle in the CRIS data. Figure 3.21 shows
total injury rate by vehicle model plotted against NCAP Pr(Injury). As expected, there
is a positive correlation: less safe vehicles experience higher rates of occupant injury.
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Figure 3.21: TX Injuries: Total
Figure 3.22 shows the same figure for no injury rate. As predicted, there is a
negative correlation.
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Figure 3.22: TX Injuries: None
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Figure 3.23 plots vehicle damage against NCAP Pr(Injury). Vehicle damage
is rated on a scale of 1 = minimal damage to 7 = maximum damage. The relationship
is ambiguous.
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Figure 3.23: TX Vehicle Damage
Figure 3.24 shows that there is no evidence of discontinuity in total crash
count in the TX CRIS data at the NCAP star ratings threshold. There is therefore
not evidence strictly from crash count numbers of driver selection, e.g. safer drivers
purchasing “safer” (e.g. 5- vs. 4-star) vehicles and driving them more safely.
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Table 3.8 shows my RD estimates for the Texas CIRS data for injury and
fatality outcomes. Outcomes are total crash counts by model, and fatality and injury
rates as total counts over total crashes by model. The large negative coefficient for
NCAP Pr(Injury) on total crashes is due to the fact that this is total crash count and
does not reflect sales volumes, which are decreasing in NCAP Pr(Injury). However, the
relationship between Pr(Injury) and occupant injury outcomes is not significant. This
is likely due to the high correlation between Pr(Injury) and curb weight. There is a
significant negative correlation between vehicle curb weight and fatality and total injury
rates.
Table 3.9 provide my results for the Texas RIS data for vehicle damage out-
comes. Rates are counts over total crash counts within 2 years of modey year by model.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Total Crashes Deaths Total Injuries Incapacitating Non-Incapacitating
NCAP Pr(Injury) -1,387 0.00192 -0.00600 0.000111 -0.00380
(1,667) (0.00156) (0.0184) (0.00416) (0.00786)
Ln(Curb Weight) -66.56 -0.00270** -0.104*** -0.0131*** -0.0476***
(1,606) (0.00130) (0.0244) (0.00325) (0.0130)
Ln(MPG)(city) -2,677 -0.00202 -0.0595* -0.00394 -0.0139
(1,870) (0.00269) (0.0357) (0.00297) (0.0117)
Ln(MPG)(highway) 4,299 -0.00277 0.102*** -0.00259 0.00252
(2,810) (0.00209) (0.0363) (0.00371) (0.0138)
Ln(Max HP) 551.6 -0.000807 -0.0223 0.000326 -0.00312
(569.9) (0.00170) (0.0202) (0.00192) (0.00932)
Constant -6,672 0.0432** 1.042*** 0.137*** 0.504***
(14,489) (0.0204) (0.189) (0.0318) (0.0987)
Observations 120,244 164,148 164,148 164,148 164,148
R-squared 0.205 0.082 0.637 0.187 0.161
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8: TX Occupant Injury Outcomes
Damage is rated on a scale from 0 (no damage) to 7 (maximum damage). The relation-
ship between vehicle damage and NCAP Pr(Injury) is ambiguous, but there is a strong
negative relationship between vehicle damage and curb weight, reflecting the greater
resilience of heavier vehicles in collisions.
Table 3.10 breaks out the linear regression results for fatal injury rates by test
type. Columns (1)-(6) provide estimates for Frontal Driver, Frontal Passenger, Side
Driver, Side Passenger, Rollover and Rollover 4WD test results, respectively. The cor-
relation with NCAP Pr(Injury) is negative and significant as expected for the Rollover
tests, but goes in the opposite direction to that we would expect for the Frontal Pas-
senger test. The results for the other crash test types are ambiguous.
Table 3.11 provides the same results for total injury rates. The correlation be-
tween NCAP Pr(Injury) and total occupant injury rate is weak and ambiguous. How-
ever, there is a strong negative relationship between total occupant injury and curb
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Damage Damage Damage Damage
NCAP Pr(Injury) -0.610*** 2.389*** -0.00170 0.258
(0.153) (0.808) (0.182) (0.712)
Ln(Curb Weight) -0.670*** -0.664***
(0.138) (0.136)
Ln(MPG)(city) 0.0997 0.105
(0.191) (0.198)
Ln(MPG)(highway) -0.119 -0.123
(0.136) (0.137)
Ln(Max HP) 0.0258 0.0258
(0.135) (0.134)
Pr(Injury)*2 -12.32*** -1.106
(3.684) (2.562)
Constant 2.195*** 2.067*** 7.695*** 7.628***
(0.0563) (0.0388) (1.720) (1.777)
Observations 172,277 172,277 160,773 160,773
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.005
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.9: TX Vehicle Damage Outcomes (max=7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FD FP SD SP Roll Roll 4WD
NCAP Pr(Injury) 0.0141 0.0157** -0.00414 -0.00738 -0.0183** -0.0329**
(0.00965) (0.00663) (0.00868) (0.00615) (0.00720) (0.0150)
Ln(Curb Weight) -0.00226 -0.000368 -0.00340* -0.00236 -0.00394* 0.00347
(0.00232) (0.000855) (0.00176) (0.00169) (0.00216) (0.00262)
Ln(MPG)(city) -0.00443 -0.00147 -0.000996 -0.00167 -0.00496 -0.00456
(0.00557) (0.00242) (0.00220) (0.00118) (0.00351) (0.00568)
Ln(MPG)(highway) -0.00169 -0.00143 -0.000931 -0.000533 -0.00457 -0.0118**
(0.00295) (0.00205) (0.00316) (0.00220) (0.00287) (0.00470)
Ln(Max HP) -0.00229 -0.000506 0.000520 -0.000244 -0.00108 -0.00844***
(0.00221) (0.00100) (0.00150) (0.000944) (0.00157) (0.00301)
Constant 0.0503* 0.0148 0.0331** 0.0295* 0.0721*** 0.0750**
(0.0295) (0.0100) (0.0137) (0.0150) (0.0248) (0.0308)
Observations 35,364 38,313 23,759 20,221 34,556 11,935
R-squared 0.142 0.163 0.035 0.042 0.228 0.460
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.10: TX Fatalities by NCAP Test Type
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weight, as expected.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FD FP SD SP Roll Roll 4WD
NCAP Pr(Injury) -0.112 0.0876 -0.149 -0.0176 0.00608 -0.209***
(0.193) (0.108) (0.133) (0.0690) (0.0845) (0.0746)
Ln(Curb Weight) -0.184** -0.0702* -0.123*** -0.166*** -0.0527* -0.0377*
(0.0752) (0.0410) (0.0306) (0.0266) (0.0310) (0.0227)
Ln(MPG)(city) -0.0487 -0.0719 -0.0786** -0.0475* -0.0731 0.0899***
(0.0349) (0.0864) (0.0316) (0.0283) (0.0605) (0.0301)
Ln(MPG)(highway) 0.0720 0.105 0.0779 0.0474 0.149** 0.0138
(0.0506) (0.0819) (0.0528) (0.0456) (0.0737) (0.0283)
Ln(Max HP) 0.0177 -0.0440 -0.0369** -0.0254 -0.0477** 0.0188**
(0.0470) (0.0336) (0.0176) (0.0206) (0.0192) (0.00894)
Constant 1.559*** 0.888*** 1.413*** 1.714*** 0.639** 0.142
(0.535) (0.250) (0.314) (0.310) (0.321) (0.175)
Observations 35,364 38,313 23,759 20,221 34,556 11,935
R-squared 0.428 0.699 0.625 0.814 0.787 0.589
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.11: TX Occupant Injuries by NCAP Test Type
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3.6 Conclusion
Publication of safety information can provide a positive public externality,
but any positive effects will be distorted if there are informational inaccuracies. This
paper evaluates whether NHTSA’s New Car Assessment Program vehicle safety ratings
accurately reflect real-world injury and fatality rates. I match NCAP safety ratings with
real-world crash data from the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) and Texas’
Crash Records Information System (CRIS). I find minimal correlation between real-
world crash outcomes and predicted risk of injury calculated in simulated NCAP crash
tests. My findings suggest reflect significant differences between labratory crash testing
procedures and actual driving conditions. My results call into question the ultimate
value of the NCAP information program to consumers.
In this paper, I am unable to address concerns of compensating behavior by
drivers which may distort intended policy effects of the NCAP program. For example,
drivers of “safer”-rated vehicles may drive more recklessly, i.e. moral hazard. [62] Future
work will use vehicle registration data to control for vehicle miles driven and additional
driver characteristics.
In addition, in future work I would also like to address how design standards
and regulations around consumer preferences and product market competition can be
used as a public policy tool to promote public health and safety on the roads. The auto
industry has historically been a driving force in the U.S. economy, reflecting a strong
manufacturing sector and consumer confidence. Further, the automobile manufacturing
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industry is a primary laboratory for technological innovation, with advancements in
vehicle technology having applications in medicine, education, communication, etc. At
the same time, we observe vehicle and brand differentiation, signaling and other forms of
monopolistic competition that suggest a potential role of policy intervention to promote
innovation in vehicle safety technology, and the adoption and the diffusion of these
potentially life-saving technologies.
One goal of the NCAP program is to promote innovation in vehicle safety
technology NCAP does not mandate safety technology, but producers may respond to a
low rating by re-designing vehicles to perform better on a consecutive crash test. As a
result, to the extent that NCAP crash test environment does not accurately reflect real-
world driving conditions, this may lead to a distortionary effect in terms of manufacturer
incentive to invest in technology that leads to better test performance at the expense of
real-world safety. If NCAP affects producer choice over investment in safety technology,
then any failures in the NCAP ratings to predict real-world vehicle performance will be
borne out in injury and loss of life on a national scale.
These concerns, coupled with my results from Chapter 2 and this paper, raise is
the question of NCAP reform. Should evaluation of safety ratings relative to real-world
crashes be restricted to specific crash types similar to those of the testing conditions?
Or do the ratings formulae need to be revised to better reflect real-world driving condi-
tions? Any reform to NCAP will have widespread public health consequences, as the US
NCAP program is emulated internationally. In addition to the US NCAP, there exist
Australasian NCAP, Euro NCAP, C-NCAP (China), JNCAP (Japan), Korea-NCAP,
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and others. Further, NHTSA’s NCAP safety ratings program is only one form of federal
vehicle regulation in the US. Perhaps other regulatory pathways would be more effective
in promoting vehicle safety with lower risk of distorting manufacturer incentives and
driver behavior.
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